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Abstract 
The study evaluated co-operative governance in integrated development planning (IDP), 
with a focus on local economic development (LED). Literature review, survey 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were data gathering instruments. 
 
Co-operative governance entailed mutual understanding with inclusive decision-making 
between government spheres and government, business and communities. This was 
unsuccessful in IDP because of national government dominance, complex tools for co-
operation, expert-controlled co-operative governance, finance-dominated planning, a 
lack of proactive municipal planning and dominance by empowered role-players. Four 
LED models, namely, a Western, Latin American, African and South African emerged. 
South Africa’s model is multi-sectoral with land management policy, investor promotion, 
institutional development, financial and social investment strategies and sufficient policy 
and legislation. However, co-operative governance in IDP (LED) is dis-functional 
because of assumed equality of stakeholders. 
 
The study recommends a ‘Quilted Co-operative Development Planning Model’, which 
has a streamlined policy framework, efficient and effective management tools and 
organisation that promote bottom-up planning. 
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Opsomming 
Die studie het koöperatiewe bestuur in geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsbeplanning (GOB) 
geëvalueer, met 'n fokus op plaaslike ekonomiese ontwikkeling (PEO). Die ondersoek 
van literatuur, opnamevraelyste en semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude was die 
instrumente vir dataversameling. 
 
Koöperatiewe bestuur het wedersydse begrip met inklusiewe besluitneming tussen 
regeringsfere en die regering, sakewêreld en gemeenskappe behels. Dit was 
onsuksesvol in GOB as gevolg van oorheersing deur die nasionale regering, 
ingewikkelde instrumente vir samewerking, ekspert-beheerde koöperatiewe bestuur, 
finansieel-gedomineerde beplanning, 'n gebrek aan  proaktiewe munisipale beplanning 
en oorheersing deur bemagtigde deelnemers. Vier PEO-modelle, naamlik 'n Westerse, 
'n Latyns-Amerikaanse, 'n Afrika- en 'n Suid-Afrikaanse model, het na vore gekom. Suid-
Afrika se model is multisektoraal met grondbestuursbeleid,  beleggingsbevordering, 
institusionele ontwikkeling, finansiële en maatskaplike beleggingstrategieë en voldoende 
beleid en wetgewing. Koöperatiewe bestuur in GOB (PEO) is egter wanfunksioneel 
weens die toegeëiende gelykheid van belanghebbendes. 
 
Die studie doen 'n "Gekwilte Koöperatiewe Ontwikkelingsbeplanningsmodel" aan die 
hand, met 'n gerasionaliseerde beleidsraamwerk, doeltreffende bestuursinstrumente en 
organisasie wat onder-na-bo-beplanning bevorder. 
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1. Background 
 
This study seeks to evaluate the extent of co-operative governance in integrated 
development planning (IDP), with local economic development (LED) as focus area. 
Co-operative governance is highlighted in the South African Constitution (Act 108 of 
1996) and in a plethora of legislation for development planning – hence the interest 
of this study in understanding whether policy provides an adequate framework for 
practice. Development planning practice seeks to reverse the consequences of 
apartheid planning, such as separate development and economic marginalisation of 
previously disadvantaged communities. The relevance of this study lies in its attempt 
at improving the functionality of the South African development planning model. It is 
also important to achieve this objective because of the energy invested by many 
stakeholders in the development of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994 as a crisp definition of development planning objectives 
and priorities. Both the 1994 RDP and the 1996 South African Constitution laid a firm 
foundation for the emergence of IDP from 1996 onwards. 
Development planning policy post-1996 is implemented through the IDP, which is a 
strategic planning approach to development planning. In this study each stage of the 
IDP shall be assessed for elements of co-operative governance. However, there 
shall be a particular focus on LED as a vital component of the IDP. Through the 
framework of co-operative governance the study will assess the degree to which the 
various spheres of government work collaboratively to enhance each other’s 
efficiency and effectiveness in development planning. 
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Mounting evidence from provincial and local government officials’ practice, as shall 
be shown later in this study, such as lack of co-operation in determining priorities, 
objectives and strategies as well as inadequate funding and implementation 
mechanisms, reveal that the South African co-operative governance model in 
development planning has limitations. These officials highlight such evidence and 
provide deeper insights into the reasons for these limitations, as the substantive part 
of this study will show. Policy recommendations will be made in order to improve the 
policy framework for development planning. The final aim is to propose a revised 
model. 
 
Though this aim could be perceived as a great undertaking, the proposed model 
could lead to better co-operative development planning practice in South Africa. The 
model will seek to simplify the co-operative development planning process without 
inducing simplicity. It will also provide mechanisms for improving the quality of 
participation.  
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1. Theoretical framework 
 
1.1. Theoretical premise 
Several assumptions underpin co-operative governance in IDP. Firstly, it is assumed 
that a national democratically elected government with its bureaucracy cannot plan 
and implement development programmes alone but through collaboration with other 
spheres of government as well as civil society, and that both, government spheres 
and civil society, are varied. Secondly, that government’s constituent parts need co-
ordination and support to achieve common objectives. Thirdly, that government must 
collaborate with business, community-based organisations and non-governmental 
organisations in the provision of its services.  
 
These assumptions are derived from political theory, which indicates that there has 
been some evolution in principles that underpin the development of the practice of 
politics or polity and choices made in the distribution of resources. Aristotle (1984:46-
47) wrote in “The Athenian Constitution” that “(1) while the state was organised in 
this way, and the many were enslaved to the few, the people rose against the 
notables. (2) The strife was fierce, and they held out against one another for a long 
time. …On gaining control of affairs Solon liberated the people, both immediately and 
for the future, by forbidding loans on the security of the person; and he enacted laws; 
he made a cancellation of debts, both private and public”. Although this specific 
example refers to a rise against unfair distribution of enslavement through financial 
domination of a majority by an elite few, the key lesson is that the majority rose 
against this distribution of resources that led to their oppression.  
  4
The expansion of the meaning of politics and political power was aptly summarised 
by John Locke (1924:118) in his “Two Treatises of Government” where he said: “ 
Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and 
consequently all less penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the 
regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in 
the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign 
injury, and all this only for the public good”. The central theme in Locke’s theory of 
political power is regulation and preservation of property and the employment of the 
force of the community, both these are essential aspects of development planning. 
Development planning is essentially about the regulation of this distribution of 
resources such as property and financial resources employing the force of the 
community. Hence the potential significance of this study, which seeks to assess 
collaborative development planning practice and in order to improve the chances of 
effective achievement of the above. 
 
Habermas is one such theorist whose communicative rationality provides a sound 
theoretical basis for an analysis of collaborative development planning. Habermas 
said that, according to Flyvbjerg (as cited in Douglas and Friedman, 1998:187), 
communicative rationality is a non-coercive, unifying, consensus building force of a 
discourse in which participants overcome their initial subjective views in favour of a 
rational agreement. Flyvbjerg (as cited in Douglas and Friedman, 1998:187) later 
makes the point that Habermas believed that mutual understanding takes the role of 
a mechanism for co-ordinating action. Principles underpinning Habermas’s theory 
are, according to Flyvbjerg (as cited in Douglas and Friedman, 1998:188), firstly, that 
all affected parties in any discussion must be included; secondly, each party should 
have equal possibility to present and criticise validity claims in the process  
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of discourse; and thirdly, participants must be able to empathize with each other’s 
valid claims. In addition, existing power differences between participants must have 
no effect on the creation of consensus and participants must openly explain their 
goals and intentions. Communicative rationality constitutes a theoretical attempt at 
democratising development through balancing of power relations and effective 
participation.  
 
Such an objective of equality is always desired but seldom reached in practice. It is, 
however, true that conflicts the world over, from the evolution of League of Nations 
after the First World War, with the exception of historic events such as those in Iraq, 
have been largely resolved through consensus-building mechanisms. The United 
Nations, World Trade Organisation and the African Union are but a few examples of 
institutions that are consensus-building. Even in development planning consensus-
building constitutes a key consideration for ensuring the appropriateness and 
acceptability of the plan for those affected. However, the weakness in Habermas’s 
view is that the process must be defined from the top (Douglas and Friedman, 
1998:189). In many respects those who design planning processes also determine 
the distribution of power. In development planning this may be regarded as “planning 
for planning” and it demarcates the agenda and role-players. Those who set the 
agenda have the power in designing the plans and processes. In this regard the 
French philosopher Michel Foucault argues that one cannot resolve the question of 
“who exercises power?” without answering the question of “how does it happen?” 
(Kritzman, 1988:103).  
 
Foucault further displays the organic relationship between ‘structure’ and ‘content’. 
Structure refers to ‘who exercises power’ and content to ‘how does it happen’. On the  
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contrary Habermas artificially separates these. Yet, as Foucault notes, authorization 
of power by law is inadequate as it is authorized in methods that are employed on all 
levels of the state and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatuses. He 
makes the point that law institutions, policies and plans provide no guarantee of 
freedom, equality or democracy (Douglas and Friedman, 1998:202). This inequality 
of power means, therefore, that the ruling class and its bureaucrats get to define the 
terms of engagement. This (inequality of power) leads Habermas to a second 
problem: that of presenting initial positions as existing on an equal plane. Such a 
perspective underplays the extent of competing agendas and the room for 
manipulation and sheer coercion on the strength of resources and technical 
authority.  
 
So what can be borrowed from Habermas regarding co-operative governance in 
integrated development planning (IDP)? Co-operative governance must be informed 
by the principles underpinning communicative rationality as these deepen democracy 
without any of the assumptions of fairness and openness on the part of role-players. 
This is where the struggle for equal participation begins – through lobbying and 
advocacy. Hence, Foucault’s contribution, co-operative governance in development 
planning may have to employ mechanisms and institutions that increase prospects of 
equal participation by the various role-players and stakeholders.  
 
If the development planning institutional framework does not proactively 
institutionalise such a participative model then the evolving political practice will 
catch-up with it. According to Castells (1997:304-305) “the nation-state is 
increasingly submitted to a more subtle, and more troubling, competition from 
sources of power that are undefined, and, sometimes, undefinable. These are  
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networks of capital, production, communication, crime, international institutions, 
supranational military apparatuses, non-governmental organisations, transnational 
religions, and public opinion movements. And below the state, there are 
communities, tribes, localities, cults and gangs. So, while nation-states do continue 
to exist, and they will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, they are, and they 
will increasingly be, nodes of a broader network of power1. They will often be 
confronted by other flows of power in the network, which directly contradict the 
exercise of their authority”.  
 
It is this diffuseness of power that makes the art of co-operative governance both 
vertically and horizontally a strategic function of government. More importantly 
because “nation-states may retain decision-making capacity, but, having become 
part of a network of powers and counterpowers, they are powerless by themselves: 
they are dependent on a broader system of enacting authority and influence from 
multiple sources” (Castells, 1997:304-5). Co-operative governance enables 
government to enact this authority and influence from multiple sources.  
 
This enactment is also very important if one considers the resources that the informal 
sector possesses in the developing world. According to De Soto (2000:27): "In Haiti 
untitled rural and urban real estate holdings are together worth some $5.2 billion. … 
this is four times the total of all the assets of all legally operating companies in Haiti, 
nine times the value of all assets owned by the government and 158 times the value 
of all foreign direct investment in Haiti’s recorded history in 1995…The value of 
extra-legally held rural and urban real estate in Peru amounts to some $74 billion. 
This is five times the total valuation of the Lima Stock Exchange before the slump of  
                                             
1 Italics are original in Castells, 1997: 304-305.  
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1998, eleven times greater than the value of potentially privatizable government 
enterprises and facilities,…consider the Philippines…The value of untitled real estate 
there is $133 billion,….nine times the total capital of state-owned enterprises”. These 
examples are just an indicator of how powerful the informal sector is relative to the 
state in the developing world. To this end De Soto (2000: 64) concludes: “Developing 
and former communist nations must choose either to create systems that allow their 
governments to adapt to the continual changes in the revolutionary division of labour 
or to continue to live in extralegal confusion - and that really isn’t much of a choice.”. 
This challenge, amongst other things, requires a closer collaboration between the 
formal and the informal sector. That is essential precisely because the informal 
sector has, according to De Soto (2000:79), even begun to assume the role of 
government. They have become responsible for the provision of basic infrastructure 
such as roads, water supply, sewage systems and electricity, the construction of 
markets, the provision of transport services and even the administration of justice 
and maintenance of order.   
 
Going back to Castells, as cited earlier, provides a succinct explanation for the 
realities and consequences of the post-modern epoch. In addition Harrison (1996:29-
30) defines some of the features of post-modernism that have an impact on planning. 
It is marked by the glorification of consumerism and use of information technology to 
“fake reality” through urban architecture of shopping malls and waterfront 
developments that hide increasing levels of impoverishment. The rise of the 
information society has also increased the mobility of global capital. More emphasis 
is being placed on entreprenuerialism. Political systems are under pressure to 
democratise and decentralise as it is becoming more difficult to control lower spheres 
of government and the people. Simultaneously this era is marked by increased social  
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polarisation as an elite minority is appropriating the benefits of technological 
advancement and globalisation whilst the majority sinks deeper into poverty.  
 
Local government is pressured by investment capital to adopt flexible planning forms 
to meet the ever-changing spatial location requirements of the Investors. This is 
coupled with the focus on place marketing and “urban entreprenuerialism”. There is a 
shift from grand strategies to minimalist frameworks and emphasis on tactical shifts. 
Alongside all of these features has emerged a tendency towards cultural pluralism, 
localism, fundamentalism, ethnicity and economic nationalism – some of them 
contradictory.  
 
What are the implications of the perceived consequences of globalisation for co-
operative governance in IDP? Development planning needs to be a mechanism for 
attending to the impoverished and decay that is seen as some of at least the 
unintended consequences of globalisation. This should entail a significant technical 
and tactical influence on capital and investment directions. No sphere alone can 
attend to and regulate the mobility of capital especially if it wanted to do so to 
improve the lives of the poor. The spirit of entreprenuerialism is in itself not a 
problem but development planning could be used to guide it towards building local 
economies whilst simultaneously providing room for poverty targeting strategies, 
which in the long run will result in economic development.  
 
Both scholarly literature and civil activism suggest that attention and indeed 
interventions should be given to efforts at reducing income differentials, in order to 
limit spiralling social polarisation and entrenched spatial segregation. This study will 
further pursue this issue by exploring how to enhance social interaction and creating  
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spaces for such integration in existing micro-spaces through development planning. 
As it is, such opportunities are found in sport, art, culture, politics and other spheres. 
Elements of normative planning, where people’s well being is at the centre of the 
planning process, as opposed to absolute positivist planning that is focusing on 
investment, assets, returns and other empirical physical measurables, are required 
to make these possible.  
 
That is not to say the influence of Trans-National Corporations (TNCs), which is 
aimed at these positivist planning concerns, is underestimated. Equally, planning 
must be adaptive and tactical. All of this requires strong local authorities with clear 
support and co-operation from upper structures, such as provincial and national 
bureaucracies, corporations, and civil society think tanks. If such support and co-
operation is to be relevant, all spheres of government involved in co-operative 
governance should, in the end, invest more resources in understanding the context 
of development planning. Such a scenario, of course, calls for monitoring 
mechanisms to be put in place. A series of studies must be conducted to monitor the 
changing environment and adapting to it.  
       
However, this is not to be idealised because it is acceptable that there is tension 
between this approach to development planning and positivist planning and 
representative democracy on the other. If the insights of Habermas and Foucault, 
and this general line of argument, are accepted in the post-modern context 
delineated above, then there is indeed uneven distribution of power amongst 
stakeholders. It is also true that community organisations suffer from power 
struggles, are often transient, and always issue-driven. At times planning is 
externally driven, with a perpetual tension between ‘positivist’ and ‘normative’  
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concerns. Resources are at times insufficient for funding planning processes 
(Rakodi, 2000:20–23).  
 
Co-operative governance in integrated development planning faces significant 
challenges. It is not only a never-ending process; there must also be a product. 
Thus, whilst co-operative governance borrows from post-modern thought by 
broadening the scope of “whose reality counts” (Vincent, 1995:188), this perspective 
goes beyond the limitations of post-modernism in that it seeks to reach outputs and 
outcomes rather than being an open-ended process. However, the plan, here as 
well, is never complete but subject to constant review so as to negotiate new 
realities, and lessons from implementation are fed back into the planning process.  
 
1.2. Co-operative Governance in South Africa 
The formal meaning of co-operative governance in South Africa is defined in the 
national constitution. Section 40(1) of Act 108 of 1996 highlights that South African 
government has three governance spheres, namely: national, provincial and local. 
These are distinct yet interdependent and interrelated. Later, Section 41(1) defines 
the principles of co-operative governance. Amongst other desired qualities and 
attributes, it mentions the following: coherence, assistance, support, co-ordination 
and consultation between the various spheres of government. These principles are 
at the core of understanding co-operative governance. They envisage dynamic, 
integrated and mutually re-enforcing roles and functions, and are based on certain 
powers and duties assigned to the different spheres of government.  
 
Edigheji (2003:73-74) highlights feedback, information sharing and co-ordination 
between government and civil society as elements of co-operative governance. In  
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this process civil society participates in agenda setting, policy formulation and 
implementation to address social exclusion arising from corporate globalisation. Co-
operative governance also enhances openness and transparency in the formulation 
and implementation of socio-economic policy. Therefore, co-operative governance in 
development planning could benefit those in civil society, who are marginalized from 
decision-making and implementation processes. Participants with a relatively equal 
amount of information are able to make effective contribution to development 
planning. Co-ordination also implies that civil society groups will initiate their own 
development planning process but co-ordinate processes with government. This 
model envisages organised civil society with human, financial and physical resources 
that can be used in development planning and plan implementation.  
 
However, the bulk of the implementation will be left to government, as they are the 
custodians of the public good, with national government providing the policy and 
legislative framework and regulating the corporations, and provincial government 
delivering services and resources, and local government working most closely with 
civil society groups. 
 
According to Edigheji (2003:74) openness and transparency increases accountability 
for development planning decisions by both government and civil society. 
Consequently, the political system benefits from inter-class compromise and 
consensus resulting in stability. The political system develops institutions that 
increase the influence of the collective against the individual in design and 
implementation of policy which reduces possibilities of corruption. Development 
planning is essentially a search for order and certainty. Planning mechanisms such 
as regulations, schemes and spatial development frameworks are all means of  
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achieving this order and stability. By having and effectively employing these 
mechanisms municipalities are also seeking openness and transparency on how 
distribution of resources and assets in space is decided upon. Collective 
development objectives of a community supersede and even guide those of 
individual development initiatives.  
 
However, Edigheji (2003:76) critiques this model from various angles. He asserts 
that stakeholders in this model are unlikely to protest against policy that they were 
party to developing. This results in political support for the neo-liberal agenda. Co-
operative governance re-focuses the agenda of civil society organisations (CSOs) to 
be consistent with neo-liberal policies. This, according to Edigheji (2003:76), leads to 
the alienation of CSO leadership from their constituency. Equally it leads to the 
contraction of the state by giving power to institutions [e.g. CSOs] that have not been 
subjected to electoral processes. In this context co-operative governance becomes a 
complex mechanism that perpetuates the agenda of global capital. From Edigheji’s 
contribution co-operative governance is a problematic process that could lead to 
class suicide and co-option.  
 
It can equally be argued that once the leadership of CSOs has been co-opted it will 
not escape the wrath of the social base that elected them in the first instance. It may 
take long, but new leadership will emerge and supplant those who have been co-
opted. In the trade union movement in South Africa this happens all the time, 
examples here include amongst others Messrs Jay Naidoo, John Gomomo, Sydney 
Mufamadi who were leaders of the trade unions and are now in government or 
business, and yet this movement continues to be strong. Essentially the material 
conditions that configure the agenda of CSOs will continue to produce leaders that  
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will best articulate the needs of membership of these CSOs. In the same vein the 
state has significant power at its disposal to bargain with global capital on behalf of 
those who have elected it. Increasingly trans-national corporations (TNCs) 
undermined this power. However, if the European Union-South Africa agreement 
process is anything to go by, governments can be more assertive in engaging global 
capital in defence of their national objectives.   
 
The South African model of co-operative governance is both a response to a past of 
apartheid exclusion and global economic isolation resulting from the disinvestment 
movement of the late 1980s through the mid-1990s. Consequently, Edigheji 
(2003:69) makes the point “that the major challenge confronting the new government 
was to reverse the apartheid inheritance by promoting co-operative governance and 
a shared growth2, that is, an economic growth that benefits all South Africans 
irrespective of race and gender. Concurrently, the new government began to initiate 
policies of outward orientation and domestic economic liberalisation as solutions to 
the socio-economic malaise”. A particularly strong point here is that the South 
African co-operative governance model has two important dimensions, namely 
political and economic integration based on effective and inclusive decision-making 
and implementation.  
 
According to Edigheji (2003:71-72) this has also entailed participation in policy 
networks in the formulation and implementation of public policy. It allows for co-
operation and competition of stakeholders as well as legitimation of the system, 
which is key to economic growth. It is this differentiated participation, resulting from 
‘competition’ in formulation and implementation of planning that entrenches  
                                             
2 Italics are in the original text.  
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what co-operative governance seeks to resolve, namely equalizing the voices of 
various stakeholders. The national stakeholders have more power than the local. 
Within the national stakeholders different stakeholders have different power. 
Globally, supra-national institutions have more power than national institutions. 
Simultaneously, some national institutions have more power than others within multi-
national institutions.  
 
What then is the chance of a local municipality achieving co-operative governance in 
IDP that is beneficial to its locality rather than to national or super-national 
prerogatives? This dynamic interaction between political and economic sectors 
occurs as vertical co-operative governance (VCG) as well as an interaction occurring 
at the same sphere within and between departments and the private sector. This is 
called horizontal co-operative governance (HCG). 
 
2.2.1. Vertical Co-operative Governance 
VCG is largely driven by national policy and is programme-based. It goes beyond 
decentralisation and speaks to active upwards and downwards engagement in 
planning and implementation. Conyers and Hills (1984:225) argue that VCG is about 
interrelationship between various spatial levels. These relations are based on the 
distribution of decision-making powers, channels of communication and procedures 
for determining the role and functions of each level. They proceed to highlight that  
this process can either be “top-down” with the starting point of planning being 
national institutions, including government or “bottom-up” where initial proposals 
come from the bottom, for example, civil society organisations, and are aggregated 
upward.  
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Evidence has shown that post-apartheid South Africa tends to favour top-down 
planning and management. In electrification, for example, ESKOM reports that they 
continue to engage their stakeholders, namely, government, customers, communities 
and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in planning processes and 
information sharing on environmental issues (ESKOM 2000:25). The electrification 
programme was one of the key RDP programmes post 1994. ESKOM as a company 
owned by government has clearly incorporated co-operative governance in its modus  
operandi. Even though their report is not explicit there seems to be no evidence of a 
“bottom-up” planning process.  
 
Further examples of “top-down” development planning programmes in post-apartheid 
South Africa include Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs), Industrial Development 
Zones (IDZs), the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme (ISRDP), 
and the Urban Renewal Programme (URP), which can be regarded as national 
programmes. According to Jourdan et al.,(1996:2), one of the initial observations in 
the evolution of SDIs was that there were several initiatives of developing areas with 
inherent economic potential where the national, provincial and local government 
were pursuing differing strategies, spatially and structurally. From this statement it 
can be inferred that Jourdan et al., (1996) preferred a nationally driven programme 
simply because there was poor co-ordination in pre-existing development planning 
efforts by the various spheres. Consequently, the weakness of Jourdan’s argument 
is that little attention is paid to the process of facilitating co-ordination between 
spheres rather than steering planning from above. Jourdan et al., (1996:5) later 
highlight successful planning, design and implementation of an SDI as requiring 
political commitment to the process between all levels of government and their 
department.  
  17
Clearly, other spheres are expected to comply and with no focus on co-ordination 
with the national sphere.  
 
This perspective permeates public-private sector interaction in institutions like the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (Nedlac). Nedlac’s role, 
according to the Nedlac Act 35 of 1994; includes promotion of economic growth, 
participation in economic decision-making and social equity. It also seeks to reach 
consensus and conclude agreements pertaining to social and economic policy. 
Nedlac considers all proposed labour legislation relating to labour markets before it is 
introduced in Parliament. Simultaneously, it considers all significant changes to 
social and economic policy before they are implemented or introduced in Parliament. 
Finally, it encourages and promotes the formulation of co-ordinated policy on social 
and economic matters (Edigheji, 2003:77-78). All of these functions are reflective of 
the political-economic integration in co-operative governance.  
 
However, the formulation of roles within NEDLAC sets out to find common solutions 
for all spheres of society. These solutions are therefore also nationally determined. It 
can be argued that there is nothing wrong with the national sphere determining such 
solutions because it is interfacing with the global economy and political systems. 
However, the unperceived consequence of such a deterministic approach at national 
level translates to the continued aggregation of power in institutions that are far from 
the intended beneficiaries of development planning, who elect representatives to the 
national sphere.  
 
SDIs are intended to achieve co-ordination of effort in planning, design and 
implementation of regional economic development programmes. Hosking and Jauch  
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(1997:27,29 and 31) indicate that despite its good intentions the Department of 
Trade and Industry has neither taken local or provincial interests into consideration 
but rather have followed a unilateral policy position of export-led economic growth 
strategy. This strategy does not take into account local socio-political conditions and 
development potential. Therefore, Hosking and Juach are pointing to the disjuncture 
between policy and practice.  
 
A similar observation is made by the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights 
(2000:14) in the Eastern Cape where the National Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry (DWAF) and Eastern Cape Nature Conservation (ECNC) dispute a land 
claim on one of the SDI nodal areas called Dwesa-Cwebe in the former Transkei 
because no overtly racist act was used for the removal of the claimants. Little 
consideration went into the fact that Transkei was a product of apartheid and its 
practises were in line with this policy. In other words the national and provincial 
spheres, in this case, failed to consider the specificity of local conditions in land 
reform. In the same report the Commission points to the overriding control of a 
privatisation programme of forests by DWAF over land restitution, thus resulting in 
the rights of the claimants being sub-ordinated to those of the preferred bidders for 
the privatisation sale. Such conflict between policy and practice demonstrates the 
domination of the national sphere and its ignorance of the local context in imposing 
national planning priorities. Despite the need for co-ordinated planning, design and 
implementation of development planning processes, real examples show that this 
need is not always made manifest.  
 
Another institution that introduced a different dimension to Vertical Co-operative 
Governance is the Finance and Fiscal Commission. In its 2001 recommendations it  
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is stated that “it is an essential feature of all multi-level government systems, federal 
and otherwise, that tensions exist and compromises must be made. These involve 
the resolution of the balance between truly decentralised provincial responsibility for 
fiscal decisions on the one hand and the achievement of national equity and 
efficiency on the other.” (FFC, 2001:23). FFC’s submission introduces a fiscal 
dimension to VCG. However, it falters by assuming that achievement of equity and 
efficiency is the sole preserve of the national sphere.  
 
Read differently though, this may mean that the revenue collected from the various 
provinces coupled with their population levels cannot be sole determinants of the 
distribution equation but rather that development needs and historical inequity are to 
be the key drivers to fiscal allocation. The national sphere, either way though, 
remains with the financial power. National government’s status and role in 
distributing revenue result in top-down planning and management.  
 
Effective VCG requires co-operation on financial planning and distribution. In other 
parts of the world various models of co-operative financial planning and distribution 
have been explored. According to Savas (as cited in Swersey and Ignall eds., 
1986:13) the United States government entered into inter-governmental agreements, 
where one level acted as an agent for the other but was bound by a service 
agreement. In 1973 alone 62% of the 2375 municipalities in the US subscribed to 
these agreements. Such agreements, if properly negotiated, provide flexibility and 
space to use financial resources from other spheres guided by the context of the 
local sphere.  
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This study will show that policies on IDP, with specific reference to LED, require an 
expanded understanding of co-operative governance. Such conceptual expansion 
will be horizontal to include civil society, business and other relevant role players. 
Harrison et al. (as cited in Reddy et al., eds., 2003:187) concur with this expanded 
version when they say that: “co-operative governance implies the co-operation of the 
various spheres of government, and the organs [of] civil society. Creating an 
enabling environment for LED demands an effective system of co-operative 
governance”. LED in South Africa is facilitated through the IDP, hence the focus of 
this study. South Africa’s democracy is over a decade old and IDPs, as well as the 
idea of LED, evolved simultaneously. 
 
2.2.2. Horizontal co-operative governance (HCG) 
 
The LED Draft Policy (2000:13), in its vision for co-operative governance pays 
particular attention to HCG. It calls for multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral 
approaches, which require innovative horizontal co-ordinating mechanisms. This 
vision of HCG envisages an interactive form of political and administrative 
management of development. The implications for development planning are that 
there should be horizontal “multi-sectoralism” and “multi-disciplinarism” in planning. It 
can further be observed from Matheson (cited in Van der Molen et al. eds., 2002:18) 
who writes about outcome-focused management in Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, that horizontal integration in 
planning will result in increased effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
However, it will have the negative by-product of difficulty of leadership. Brinkerhoff 
(as cited in Theron et al. eds., 2000:206, 210) attempts to deal with this difficulty,  
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when he writes about democratic governance. He identifies constituency building as 
a tool for mobilising support for reforms. He also makes the point that cross-
institutional checks and balances including power-sharing in decision-making and 
independent monitoring is key to consensus building.  
 
In assessing co-operative governance in IDP this study will review the extent to 
which apartheid patterns of distributing resources spatially are either being 
unwittingly continued or are being reversed. Such a focus is important since 
countries in transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic dispensation tend 
to continue the economic policy of the preceding authoritarian government because 
of a broad and entrenched beneficiary class and the insulation of the technocratic 
stratum committed to policy continuity (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995:228-9). South 
Africa equally runs this risk because the democratic government evolved from a 
negotiated political settlement rather than a political-economic settlement. A political 
settlement tends to leave economic relations between the oppressor and the 
oppressed unaffected. Development planning is a political-economic process that  
seeks to achieve political as well as economic equity.  
 
The economy of South Africa is largely owned, controlled and operated by white 
South Africans and multi-national corporations. In addition, white South Africans own 
the technical and technocratic skills required to run the country’s sophisticated 
economy. Therefore, the risk is that this will continue unless effective co-operative 
governance enables the different spheres of government to implement development 
planning models that result in, amongst others, significant economic redistribution. 
The Black Economic Empowerment strategy adopted by national government post-
2000 largely leaves this redistributive process in the hands of the private individuals  
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and the free market. Whereas development planning seeks to redefine physical, 
fiscal and spatial redistribution of factors of production by directing public and private 
investment to marginalised groups and areas. Social-compacts should be reached 
with civil society and business to achieve successful redistribution. This has worked 
relatively well in the Scandinavian countries, where taxation amongst other 
instruments was used as a redistributive tool for fighting unemployment and poverty.  
 
1.3. Integrated Development Planning 
Conyers and Hills (1984:60) define integrated development planning as an 
interdisciplinary approach to planning which bridges the gap between economic 
development planning and physical planning. In South Africa, the Local Government 
Transition Act (No. 209 of 1993), amended in 1996, introduced the concept of IDP. 
This was further elaborated in the White Paper on Local Government (1998) by the 
then Department of Constitutional Development (DCD). The emphasis by DCD was 
on building local government administrative systems such as budgeting, planning 
and communication. It heralded a shift from structural and narrow land use planning  
to a more strategic and egalitarian planning approach. The IDP, therefore, is seen as 
a redistributive tool.  
 
In the Local Government Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) (LGSA), the IDP is defined 
as a strategic plan that co-ordinates and integrates plans, aligns resources and 
implementation capacity. It provides the policy framework for annual budgeting and 
is compatible with national and provincial development plans (Sec. 25 (1) (a-e)). The 
purpose of an IDP is to align plans and strategies of a district municipality with those  
of its constituent affected municipalities as well national plans in order to ensure co-
operative governance (Act No. 32, 2000 (24) 1). Its content is to reflect the council’s  
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long term development vision, to assess existing levels of development in the 
municipality, setting development priorities and objectives, local economic 
development aims, internal transformation, alignment with sectoral plans of other 
spheres of government, spatial development framework, the council’s operational 
strategies, disaster management plan, a financial plan, key performance indicators 
and performance targets (Sec. 26). 
 
The above background and definition of IDP shows that no single development 
planning tradition can account for IDP but rather an ensemble of elements from 
various traditions, namely, according to Friedman (as cited in Mandelbaum et al. 
eds., 1996:17-28) policy analysis, social learning, social reform and social 
mobilization. Evidently, IDP covers a range of planning issues over several spheres. 
In this context the focus on LED in this study narrows the assessment of co-
operative governance in development planning. 
 
1.4. Local Economic Development 
1.4.1. Local Economic Development 
 
Local Economic Development (LED) has many perspectives underpinning it. It is 
important to understand these before the adequacy of the IDP can be assessed. 
According to Blakely (1994:49-50), LED is a process by which local governments, 
along with local corporate firms, join forces and resources to enter into new 
partnership agreements with the private sector or each other, in order to create new 
jobs and stimulate economic activity in a well defined economic zone. It emphasizes 
“endogenous development” policies using the potential of local human, institutional 
and physical resources. Blakely (1994:59-62) explores a synthetic theory of local 
  24
economic development. He identifies boosting local employment, building the 
institutional base, developing locational assets such as recreational, housing and 
social institutions as well as building knowledge resources to tap into the intellectual 
resources of the area. This theoretical proposition is summarised in diagram 2.4.1. 
below. Seasons (ND:10) notes that LED is the long-term process of change with the 
goal of stimulating local economic activity. He later says economic development 
includes the notion of structural change on the economic and social level, or both. 
Ultimately all these efforts lead to the revival of depressed economies through 
stimulation of economic activity. 
 
Similarly, LED prominence, according to Harvey (cited in Rogerson, 1995: v), across 
the developed world is associated with the weakening of centralised economic 
management, attempts by localities to counter the effects of global economic 
restructuring, and the new openings for local economic intervention that arise from 
the “aftermath” of Fordism and the vertical disintegration of production to “flexible” 
small enterprises. Furthermore, in cities there has taken place a remarkable 
transformation in urban governance from an era of managerialism, which focused 
primarily on the local provision of services and facilities, to one of urban 
entreprenuerialism as the local government became preoccupied by speculative 
deployment of local resources to mobilise investment of private capital. An example 
of this can be found in infrastructure development programmes in major cities such 
as Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. This investment seeks to reduce the 
operational overheads of business by making it easy for business to access the 
market and vice-versa.  
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Diagram 2.4.1: Pillars of LED developed from Blakely (1994) (Table 3.2.) 
Commentators on LED agree that this development approach emerged, amongst 
other things, as a response to the globalising economy. Sengenberger (1993:313) 
commented on it, saying that “we observe the accelerating internationalisation of 
production, the globalisation of markets and the formation of international trading 
blocs and common markets, and on the other hand the re-emergence of local 
economies, in the form of local networks of suppliers to large companies, small-firm 
industrial districts, and local employment initiatives.” These observations are 
consistent with the rise in local identities and cultural spaces as observed by Castells 
(1997:304-5). The dichotomy inherent in globalisation expresses itself in the 
economic sphere – centralisation sits alongside decentralisation. In its schemata 
there occurs the simultaneous maximisation of wealth accumulation and the 
deepening of poverty. In this context LED could be considered one of the responses 
by those marginalized from the global economy. It is a mechanism of re-engagement 
and maximisation of local economic benefit. 
 
LED is driven, in its re-engagement process, by several principles. Amongst others, it  
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is driven by the principle of clustering. According to Sengenberger (1993:316-7) local 
clustering carries many advantages. It can save overheads through joint 
procurement and utilisation of resources (e.g. the sharing of tools and machinery) 
and achieve economies from the pooling of labour, financial and physical capital, and 
infrastructure. It can alleviate risks through the exchange of information and goods 
(e.g. spare parts in cases of machine breakdowns); it can speed up the flow of goods 
and reduce the cost of information and transport within the industry, because of the 
short spatial and social distance between firms (Marshal, 19193), and lead to the 
early exposure of imbalances, needs or constraints within the cluster to be 
addressed or exploited (Potter, 1990:157). Furthermore, LED can reduce 
vulnerability and the risk of bottlenecks and shortages – for example, if one supplier 
fails for some reason to deliver a part or component in time, there are other suppliers 
who can step in to deliver. The LED approach can help to maintain and improve 
technology through close cooperation between producers and users of capital 
equipment, and it can facilitate marketing and exportation through the provision of 
“real services” (Brusco, 1992). In addition to acting as a strong magnet to attract 
talented people, LED can promote the local supply and demand which is so 
beneficial to the functioning of local labour markets. 
 
Another principle of LED is endogenous development, which emphasizes the need to 
organise local development from inside. This entails organising capital, labour and 
institutional resources (Sengenberger, 1993:319). These resources can then be used 
creatively to build the local economy. Hence, local capital and labour define the 
unique comparative advantage of the locality. Moreover, institutional resources are 
used to support those starting new enterprises with information, technical advice and 
                                             
3 Note that Sengenberger doesn’t include a page number in his reference to Marshal. 
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business planning services. The principle as a whole augurs well for local confidence 
in the local economy.  
 
The promotion of inter-firm linkages (Sengenberger, 1993: 317) also underpins LED. 
This promotional dynamic is derived from clustering, where firms work together as 
suppliers to the external market and to each other. Such networking between firms 
facilitates word-of-mouth marketing and referrals. It is also important for sharing 
information. Networking could also see them bidding jointly for profitable projects. 
Lobbying by collectively seeking changes in policy and regulations and advocacy 
through collectively championing and organising for concessions that favour their 
businesses also constitute a key function for these networks.  
 
However, these networks do not work because people are clustered or in the same 
field but owing to trust and loyalty based on political, religious, ethnic and institutional 
relations (Sengenberger, 1993:317). Such relations lead to trust because people will 
have worked together under different conditions, know each other and built 
friendships. As such they can depend on each other for support, advice and 
guidance. Even though the negative consequences of this could be nepotism, its 
positive effect is building interpersonal relations and using those as a basis for doing 
business together. Consequently, such business people could constitute a referral 
network. They also trust that product quality will be good and that is based on the 
long-standing relationship.  
 
Product quality is also important because any product that goes out to the market 
labelled “made in city xxx” reflects on the brand of the local economy. Similarly, 
products of poor quality undermine the brand of the locality and vice-versa. Flexibility 
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of production processes has become significant with LED. This is due to the focus on 
quality output and outcome rather than rigid processes. Product quality no longer 
depends on the availability of tightly controlled production process but rather on the 
application of resources and technology wherever they are. An example of this is the 
Boeing Company’s commercial jet airliner, the 777. Eight Japanese suppliers make 
parts for the fuselage, doors, and wings; a supplier in Singapore makes the doors for 
the nose landing gear (Hill 2004:8). These resources and technology must just be 
efficiently available and that use must be profitable. However, quality arising from the 
smart usage of resources and technology is also dependent on the extent of 
innovative production. 
 
Each locality, be it a municipality or an economic region, in LED is challenged to 
promote innovative production and thus sustain product quality. Innovation in 
production provides a unique identity to the producer and the location of the 
producer. Municipal or local identity can be derived from production, some examples 
of this include Stutterheim and timber production, Grahamstown and the Arts 
Festival, Somerset East and the Biltong festival. As can be seen from these 
examples, there are many places that produce timber, host arts festival and produce 
biltong but these localities have innovatively produced these commodities in a 
distinctive manner thus resulting in shared identities. All of this necessarily require 
better management and improved industrial organization that is propelled by 
municipal or regional economic policy and strategy. 
  
In LED better management is vital for success. Here the locality needs to invest in 
institutional management mechanisms that enable efficient decision-making, and 
specifically streamlining decision-making processes. As such, effective LED requires 
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decentralisation of decision-making as economic investment decisions are made 
faster now than ever before. If municipalities have limited decision-making powers 
with respect to LED this is detrimental to growing local economies. In avoiding 
anarchy and uneven economic development, it might be useful for the upper spheres 
of government to work with the local spheres as “internal consultants” guiding them 
towards making economic decisions beneficial to their economies but also consistent 
with regional and national economic objectives. An example of this could include a 
municipality being able to negotiate a tariff regime for its services that excludes 
national taxation and customs duties. It may also craft by-laws and regulations with 
the local economy in mind. These should be tailor-made to ensure efficiency of the 
local economy. These regulations encourage industrial development and growth by 
setting aside land for industrial parks, for instance. Furthermore the municipality is 
required to plan its systematic support to the local economy. Business units within 
the municipality may enhance management by collaborative organization and co-
ordination of economic support. The municipality is expected to lead local economic 
development and one way of doing this is achieving better industrial organisation by 
investing physical infrastructure in industrial zones demarcated in its spatial plans.  
 
The municipality is expected to lay out infrastructure required for economic growth, 
including water, sanitation and electricity, and social upliftment as part of its industrial 
organisation strategy. In this regard Sengenberger (1993:320) argues that this 
emanates from the presumption that local funds are better spent on investing in the 
physical and social infrastructure – local transport and communication, technical 
services, education and training, housing – with a view to developing the area’s own 
resources, encouraging new technologies and products, and improving the quality of 
work and life in the area. Such infrastructural and social investment lays the basis for 
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the development of a location that would be attractive to both internal and external 
investors. Sengenberger (1993:320) further submits that investors are to be attracted 
not simply by untargeted money, or cheap land, cheap labour, etc., but by high-
quality resources such as education, entertainment and cultural activity. Investors in 
turn, he further argues, are encouraged to commit themselves to explicit local 
development projects and objectives. Commitment to local development implies 
participation by local role-players and stakeholders in economic development. 
  
In LED, more than in any other development perspective, citizen mobilisation forms a 
vital element. Local citizens are vital to embracing the “entrepreneurial culture” 
induced by LED. However, entrepreneurialism requires relatively good skills level. 
Consequently, local citizens are recruited to improve their skills so as to enrich the 
labour market through, amongst others, skills development programmes funded by 
the municipality and in certain instances with private sector contribution.  
 
All the above components of LED define generic requirements for effective economic 
development. The application, non-application and mis-application of some of these 
components has led the evolution of several loose models, namely, “western model”, 
“Latin-American model”, “African model” and the “South African model”. Although 
these models are historical aggregates observed through the study of LED in various 
societies, it must be acknowledged that there are inter-country and inter-municipal 
variances and as such the use of the word “model” refers to the general 
characteristics as observed over time by several scholars, who shall be referred to 
below.  
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1.4.2. The Western model 
There are several theories underpinning the meaning of LED and these are informed 
by the economic history and structure of certain regions of the world. In the United 
States the meaning of LED, according to Blakely (1994:48), is derived from an 
understanding of communities as market places, and that they should market their 
resources to gain competitive advantage through creating new firms and maintaining 
their existing economic base. This competitive advantage is based on the human, 
social, institutional and physical resources. This perspective is a product of some of 
the historical elements of economic development in the US.  
 
In the 1960s the US urban areas saw a decline in private investment, which in part 
was due to the availability of cheaper production inputs such as labour and raw 
material in developing countries, which resulted in relocation of some of the firms 
from the US to these countries. The 1970s saw a national economic recession that 
resulted in dislocations, unemployment, out-migration of labour and economic 
activity, as well as chronic municipal fiscal stress (Barnekov et al., 1989:63).  
 
When tracing the evolution of LED policy in the US, Barnekov et al., (1989:65-73), 
highlight as dimensions community mobilization, creation of conditions for growth, 
utilizing local talents and capacities, mobilizing resources and generally improving 
the value of people and places. US policy emphasized linking urban communities to 
local business prosperity, focusing on employment, subsidizing business in low 
income areas, developing labour skills, partnering between local government and 
business, and providing federal government incentives for investing in depressed 
areas as the major instruments of LED. It can be observed that the US model of LED 
is that of an active state, which mobilizes resources, the community and the private 
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sector, thus facilitating economic activity. The US model is also underpinned by an 
objective of improving market mechanisms. Federal government sets policy, 
develops strategy and provides financial instruments to local (that is county or city) 
government. The President Carter era had several examples of this, which marked 
vertical co-operative governance (VCG). Partnership with the private sector and 
communities defines horizontal co-operative governance (HCG). According to the US 
model, in HCG the state has to be more enterprising and in VCG there is more 
emphasis on decentralizing economic responsibility to the local government sphere.  
 
Like the US, the British cities suffered under the economic recession of [the mid- 
through late-1970s and] 1980-1 resulting in 12% unemployment, with heavy 
concentration of this in inner-city areas as well as civil disorder (Barnekov et al., 
1989:181). This was evident in Bradford, Birmingham and parts of London. In 
response to this the British administration evolved a LED strategy. Barnekov et al., 
(1989:186-190,196) highlight that this strategy entailed redirection of public funds 
towards local economic activity, promotion of public-private partnerships and 
leveraging as important elements of LED in the UK. Primary criteria of LED projects 
in this perspective were employment creation, locating industries in economically 
depressed areas, and economic feasibility. The pro-capital Conservative Party 
government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1988) emphasized 
privatisation of parts of the English cities in order to avail more resources for local 
development. Municipalities agreed to this in return for more resources.  
 
The western model is equally informed by the “neo-classical counterrevolutionary 
economic theory” as outlined in Todaro’s “Economic Development” (1997). Todaro 
(1997:86-87) highlights the components of this theory as supply-side macroeconomic  
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policies, rational expectations theory and privatisation of public corporations. It also 
encompasses creation of freer markets, dismantling public ownership, statist 
planning and government regulation of economic activity. This perspective argued 
that less developed economies suffered from corruption, inefficiency and a lack of 
incentives for investing. The “market-friendly approach”, a strain of this theory argues 
that government’s role in less developed economies is investment in physical and 
social infrastructure, health care facilities, educational facilities and creating a 
suitable climate for private enterprise. Hence the emphasis of both the US and UK 
on growth and private sector centred LED approaches, where the local government 
plays a de-regulatory role. Therefore, the function of the state in the Western model 
is to create an environment conducive to private sector success. 
 
These theoretical positions underpin the policy and practice of LED as found in the 
West. Similarly, Botchway et al., (in Coetzee et al, 2001:396), converge with this 
view when they define LED as an interaction of employment, employability, 
enterprise and the economic environment. The foci of this view are job creation, skills 
development, encouraging enterprising activities and the provision of appropriate 
infrastructure for business development. This model is based on the experience of 
Coventry in the UK. The British model of LED equally emphasizes the enterprising 
role of the municipality and a strong relationship of local government with the private 
sector. Simultaneously it empowered the private sector in this relationship.  
 
In both the US and British models, LED comes through as a practical movement 
responding to limitations of the national state to “protect” jobs lost mainly from the 
decline of the Fordist manufacturing era. It encompasses strategies endogenously 
developed. Local capacities are the central aspect of LED. These capacities must be  
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guided with active participation and leadership of local government to lead to a 
growing local economy. Four pillars of this approach include mobilisation of the 
community into economic action, intervention by creating conditions that are 
conducive to local economic growth, promotion of local talents and capacities, and 
mobilisation of resources to drive the programmes.  
 
Main elements of LED are SMME funding, information and training and social 
animation. Blakely (1994:49) makes the point that LED is a new process by which 
local governments, along with local corporate firms, join forces and resources to 
enter into new partnership arrangements with the private sector or each other, in 
order to create new jobs and stimulate economic activity in a well-defined economic 
zone. Blakely (1994:60) says that the goal of LED is to enhance the value of people 
and places. 
 
Summarily, the Western model has the private sector as the central component of 
LED. Government’s role is to support the private sector in playing this role.  
 
1.4.3. The Latin American model 
In Latin America, the model of LED prevailing is significantly different from the US 
and UK models. Armstrong and McGee (1985:61- 68) trace the economic history of 
the region as being marked by European conquest, which made them tentacles of 
capital accumulation by transnational corporations (TNCs). Conquest led to the 
growth of urban settlements along the South American Atlantic coastal belt, which 
became administrative sub-centres of the empire. They became nodes for facilitating 
export of raw materials and minerals as well as places for capital accumulation. The 
ruling class invested in the local economy, using surplus from this accumulation  
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process. The local economy defined itself as a linkage between the export sector, 
the consumer market and a growing labour force with limited diversification into 
domestic marketing. In addition the ruling class and state were, and still are, 
subordinated to foreign interests.  
 
In these countries, local economies modernized through commercialised agriculture. 
Thus, subsistence farming communities gave way to technical and capital-intensive 
farming and the former subsistence farmers were either available as cheap labour or 
unemployed migrants to urban economies. There were also free trade zones for 
promoting export trade and national government provided infrastructure, tax relief 
and lower wage rates amongst other incentive packages. These packages were 
aimed at attracting foreign investors. They had also resulted in increased spatial 
concentration, which in turn increased demand in infrastructure and services 
investment to maintain, according to De Mattos (1982:75), a perceived efficiency and 
dynamism. Even though the Latin American model of LED is different, it shares the 
centrality of the private sector to building local economies.  
 
The differences include a lack of focus on endogenous strategies of economic 
regeneration. There is a lack of focus on skilling labour and enterprise development. 
Finally, there is the manifest absence of a role for local government, and instead we 
see a nationally-driven perspective of producing for the international economy. The 
limited role of local government contradicts the dynamism of the process. In this 
model the rural poor and landless peasants are pushed off the land and pulled to the 
cities, thus putting pressure on the provision of infrastructure and services as pointed 
out above. 
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1.4.4. The African Model 
 
LED in Africa takes on a different meaning from the above two models. Kharoufi in 
Swilling, ed. (1997:61) makes the point that in North Africa (e.g. Cairo) there are 
significantly high levels of unemployment, with the informal sector dominating the 
urban economy. Informal associations that mobilise funds for trading as well as 
providing socio-economic infrastructure drive it. Kharoufi in Swilling, ed. (1997:79) 
makes the point that North Africa has experienced urbanisation without employment 
resulting in production systems that cannot cope with the demand for employment 
and urban management systems that are weak. Halfani in Swilling, ed. (1997:121-
122)  makes the point that in East Africa, due to limited capacity for resource 
mobilisation, central government agencies assume the role of managing investment 
and operations of urban development. Until late 1980s East African cities 
emphasized physical development and technical management at the expense of 
building institutions.  
 
This centralism and technocratic management resulted in weak municipalities that 
were unable to drive LED. Attahi in Swilling, ed. (1997:180-181) provides more 
evidence from Francophone Africa. He reflects that communes, equivalents of 
municipalities, have powers to intervene in economic and social development but 
they behave as if this is the exclusive responsibility of the central government. None 
of them had developed or implemented a real strategy for their external promotion; 
investment promotion, industrial parks, and they don’t participate in the activities of 
local Chamber of Commerce and Industries. From the above it can be concluded 
that the African model of LED is marked by centralism.  
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This feature goes against the western model that sees LED in essence as a locally 
driven process with collaborative support from upper spheres. It must also be 
appreciated that in Africa LED is firmly within the agenda of the state. Subsequently, 
East African municipalities have a strong informal sector that attends to areas such 
as urban housing and employment creation. This sector has also transformed the 
concentric spatial form inherited from the colonial city into a multiple nuclei city 
marked by a de-concentration of production and service activities within diverse 
neighbourhoods. An example of this is the development of informal settlements 
closer to places of work that redefine urban space. In Kenya and Tanzania the 
informal sector employ approximately 40% of the urban population.  
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) observed that in Kenya the informal 
sector allowed for ease of entry into the economy, reliance on indigenous resources, 
family enterprises, labour intensive skills acquired outside the formal school system 
and for competitive markets (Halfani in Swilling, ed. 1997:132, 136). Halfani in 
Swilling ed. (1997:153) makes another salient point in this regard – that the informal 
sector has displayed options for poverty intervention, which include shelter, land 
management, micro-enterprises, urban agriculture, commodity trading and vending, 
service provision and credit mobilisation.  
 
It is this organic economic capacity, read together with the assets held by the 
informal sector as displayed by De Soto (2000:29) earlier, which lies at the base of 
any future formally driven LED in Africa. Where Africa is concerned, De Soto 
(2000:29) indicated that the total value of African informal real estate is worth $0.97 
trillion. Another conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that there is a 
small formal business community in the African city. This, therefore, means that the  
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active leadership and participation by business seen in the western model can only 
be substituted by the informal sector. If this conclusion is true then there is a need for 
a deeper understanding of the working of this sector and acceptable terms of its 
engagement in a thorough going economic transformation process.  
 
Another feature of the LED model of Africa is the incorporation of land under the 
jurisdiction of chiefs into urban spaces. This, in Uganda, has resulted in land being 
held under three tenure systems, namely leasehold, freehold and customary tenure, 
resulting in a complex land management system in urban areas (Halfani in Swilling 
ed. 1997:129). For the purpose of comparative study, customary tenure is the most 
problematic of the three because of a lack of documentation, as the case is in 
Uganda. Complex land management means that it is hard to take decisions on the 
release of land for development because the process is convoluted and multiple-
level decision-making takes time. Consequently, the investor may decide against 
investing because it’s costly to keep idle money that is meant for investment. This is 
a challenge to LED because economic investment requires ease in decision-making 
and clarity of land rights as all development occurs on land.  
 
Furthermore, property development and infrastructure improvement require that 
there be clarity on the property rights. Such clarity will also enable the market value 
of such property and land to increase. Private investors require confidence that their 
investment in property will yield appropriate returns. The challenge for LED 
practitioners at a local level and strategy and policy crafters at the regional and 
national level is to attend to the complex web of tenure systems and its effect on 
property rights. The above-mentioned challenges are further complicated by 
unabated poverty in Africa, which means that any LED programme in the African  
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context must have a poverty-alleviation component. In Tanzania by 1991, 39.5% of 
the urban population lived below the relative poverty datum line of US$227. 
 
In Kenya in 1992, 29.3% of the urban population lived below the absolute poverty 
line of US$240 and in Uganda this figure stood at 37% below an absolute poverty 
line of US$120. In Kenya it is estimated that 60% of the urban population live in 
shelter without infrastructural service and tenure security (Halfani in Swilling, ed. 
1997:148). In responding to the challenges of poverty the Tanzanian and Kenyan 
governments introduced a Small Scale Industrial Development Organisation in 1973 
aimed at promoting small industries through establishment of industrial estates, 
distribution of loans to industrial and processing establishments. It also provided 
modern technology, infrastructure, power and extension services. These 
programmes registered initial success but were later hampered by organisational 
problems and rapid population growth (Halfani in Swilling, ed. 1997:152). 
 
1.4.5. The South African Model 
 
In South Africa the role of local government in LED is derived from the RDP and the 
Local Government Transition Act of 1993 and its amended version of 1996. The RDP 
policy document stated that strong metropolitan government should be established to 
assist with the integration and co-ordination of urban economies. It also stated that 
local authorities should extend municipal services, deal with backlogs in municipal 
services and inculcate a culture of developmental local government (ANC 1994:129-
30). These points were consolidated in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (Act 108 of 1996 (S 152 (1) b), where local government is given the role of 
promoting social and economic development, amongst others.  
  40
 
The LED perspective of this study is that land reform is at the centre of economic 
development in many if not all municipalities. Consequently, the starting point is the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996:11-12), which 
addresses rural development challenges through the Bill of Rights clause 25, also 
known as the “Property Clause”. The clause states, “No one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application”. In addition, “A person or 
community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress”. This clause 
empowers the state to address the land reform question of the country. It is also 
consistent with Act 22 of 1994 (Restitution of Land Rights Act), which defines those 
entitled to restitution as those who were dispossessed in 1913 and its primary object 
is to redress the effect of the 1913 dispossession. This Act sets up the Commission 
on Restitution of Land Rights (s.4) and defines the procedure of claiming (s.11).  
 
Another important legislation is the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (62 of 1997), 
whose main object is the facilitation of long-term security of land tenure; regulate 
conditions of residence on certain land, conditions and circumstances for termination 
of tenure and land eviction. This is the legislation that could be defined as 
responding to the structural inadequacies that were instituted by betterment policies. 
Betterment policies were notorious in the 1950s and 60s for the destruction of the 
Black rural economy. Other important legislations to be reviewed are the Land 
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (3 of 1996), which provides the security of tenure for 
labour tenants and use of land by those associated with labour tenants and the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful occupation of Land Act (19 of 1998),  
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which prohibits unlawful eviction and sets procedures for eviction of unlawful 
occupiers. This Act is dubbed as being biased to the squatter. All these legislation 
set a framework for the land reform process. They are the pillars of land reform. 
These Acts are largely derived from the White Paper on Land Reform of 1995.  
 
There are also three crucial policy documents guiding rural development and land 
reform in South Africa: the White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) (White 
Paper), Rural Development Framework (1997) (RDF) and the Integrated Sustainable 
Rural Development Strategy (2000) (ISRDS). The White Paper seeks to redress the 
injustices of apartheid, foster national reconciliation and stability, underpin economic 
growth, improve household welfare and alleviate poverty (Department of Land 
Affairs, 1997: v).  The White Paper also sets up three programmes: the land 
redistribution programme, land restitution programme and the land tenure 
programme. These are then accompanied by financial grants (Department of Land 
Affairs, 1997:vi – xiii).  
 
The RDF, on the other hand, seeks to facilitate inter-sectoral planning and co-
ordination by all rural people and government in the rural development process. Its 
2020 Vision highlights diverse agriculture, “economy of participation”, periodic 
markets, diverse commercial and service sectors, access to government information,  
availability of water, sanitation and fuel, local government structures, close links of 
local government civil society and business, safety and security, healthy children and 
fewer poor people as the ultimate objectives of rural development (Department of 
Land Affairs, 1997:15).  Its main strategies entail building the capacity of local 
government in fulfilling its constitutional mandate.  
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These include setting up District Land Offices for expediting land reform, the 
promotion of economic development through LED, agriculture, forestry, tourism, rural 
industries, SMMEs, financial services, and also labour-intensive programmes. 
Another key strategy of the RDF is building rural infrastructure for water and 
sanitation, access roads, energy and housing. It also highlights the importance of 
Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) in rural development. The other strategies in 
the RDF are building social stability and the local capacity to plan and implement 
rural development. (DLA b 1997:23 – 71) This broad menu sets the framework for 
government programmes and enforces the desire to integrate development. It is now 
known that government is battling with this due to a lack of capacity and in other 
cases rivalry between departments. 
 
The ISRDS emerged as a response to this weakness in year 2000. It was a desire of 
the President’s Office to improve co-operative governance. The vision of the strategy 
has social cohesion, stable communities, viable institutions, accessible social 
amenities and available skills and knowledge as the elements of rural development 
government wants to see. It acknowledges progress made in the first six years of the 
democratic government. Lessons from this era include the problem of targeting, 
urban bias, poor disbursement of resources aimed at rural areas and the 
deteriorating health situation due to HIV/AIDS, all of which can be said to be 
consequences of non-cooperative governance. It therefore seeks to target the most 
vulnerable groups, namely; rural poor, women, youth and the disabled. A notable 
development is the significant role given to social capital (e.g. stokvels, burial 
societies and other collective resource mobilisation mechanisms) as a catalyst for 
development. The more significant part of the ISRDS strategy is dedicated to 
enunciating the co-ordination mechanism.  
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The ISRDS strategy utilises a nodal approach, which entails clustering public and 
economic services in one or more municipalities in order to produce a pull factor for 
further economic activity into the area, to development planning. This nodal 
development will be guided by existing criteria used by departments in targeting 
areas for development. The various institutions that offer resources for rural 
development will pull these into a “basket of resources”. Expenditure from this basket 
will be demand driven as opposed to the first six years of supply driven development 
expenditure. More support will be given to municipalities in the node. In turn 
municipalities are required to create an “expenditure envelope” which integrates all 
the programmes of the institutions that provide the resources.  
 
The strategy makes provision for a performance monitoring system, which will bind 
municipalities through a performance contract. The contract will be between the 
municipality and provincial and national departments. Furthermore, municipalities will 
be given human resource development support, technical support through NGOs, in  
this case a quasi-NGO called the Independent Development Trust (IDT) has played 
this role in the national and provincial departments, fast tracking the land reform 
process, provision of safety nets and political and technical support from the 
Presidency. The strategy also emphasizes a gradual approach to the implementation 
of development projects. The downside of the strategy is that the budget for 
development will not be increased but re-organised to be more effectively and 
efficiently utilised.  
 
In 1997 the Department of Housing published an “Urban Development Framework” 
(UDF). UDF stated that LED is emerging as a strategy [that] has the potential to  
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address the economic problems [that] prevail in South Africa’s various localities. It 
then goes on to state the objectives of LED as being: 
• To emphasise the role of municipalities in facilitating LED; 
• To encourage local partnerships and development compacts around 
specific economic activities; 
• To promote SMMEs in alignment with the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s White Paper on the sector; and 
• To ensure that LED contributes to job creation on RDP and capital works 
projects in direct association with the implementation of the R250 million 
RDP-funded National Public Works Programme (Department of Housing, 
1997:35-6)  
It was in 1998 when the White Paper became explicit in defining developmental local 
government as having four pillars, namely:  
• Provision of household infrastructure and services; 
• Creation of liveable, integrated cities, towns and rural areas; 
• Local economic development and 
• Community empowerment and redistribution 
LED is defined in a subsequent section as a process of promoting job creation and 
boosting the local economy as well making the local area a pleasant place to live and 
work in through the provision of basic services. The White Paper highlights two 
important initiatives for LED: 
• Reviewing of existing policies and procedures to promote local economic 
development; and 
• Provision of special economic services (White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998:22-6). 
  45
These are the principles and objectives that run through the Municipal Demarcation 
Act, Municipal Structures Act (1998) and Municipal Systems Act (2000).  
 
Another critical policy for LED is the White Paper on Municipal Services Partnerships 
published by the Department of Provincial and Local Government in 2000. Municipal 
Service Partnerships (MSPs) are seen as tools for enhancing the ability of the 
municipality to deliver. The need for this is derived from the high demand of public 
services that outpaces available government finances. MSPs are partnerships for 
service delivery with other public institutions, the private sector or CBOs/NGOs.  
 
In this section, the study will highlight that there is sufficient basis in theory and 
legislation for embarking on co-operative governance in LED. The vision, principles 
and goals of LED are elaborated in all the policies and legislation mentioned above. 
 
1.5. South African Development Planning framework  
Having reviewed the different paradigms of LED, the study turns to the development-
planning context or integrated development planning. The Local Government 
Transition Act (No.209 of 1993) which was later amended in 1996 introduced the 
concept of IDP. IDP was further elaborated in the White Paper on Local Government 
in 1998 by the then Department of Constitutional Development (DCD). The emphasis 
by DCD was on building local government administrative systems such as budgeting, 
planning and communication. It heralded a shift from structural and narrowly land 
use planning to a more strategic and egalitarian planning approach.  
 
The IDP is defined in the Local Government Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000) (LGSA) 
as a strategic plan that co-ordinates and integrates plans, aligns resources and 
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implementation capacity, [it is] the policy framework for annual budgeting and is 
compatible with national and provincial development plans (Sec. 25 (1) (a – e)). The 
purpose of an IDP is to align plans and strategies of a district municipality with those 
of its constituent affected municipalities as well as with national plans in order to 
ensure co-operative governance (Act No. 32, 2000 (24) 1). Furthermore, the IDP is a 
strategic framework that seeks to integrate planning by the three spheres of 
government. Its content has to reflect the council’s long term development vision, to 
assess existing levels of development in the municipality, setting development 
priorities and objectives, local economic development aims, internal transformation, 
alignment with sectoral plans of other spheres of government, spatial development 
framework, the council’s operational strategies, disaster management plan, a 
financial plan, key performance indicators and performance targets (Sec. 26).  
 
The IDP comes across as a strategic management tool for the municipality. It looks 
at both the internal capacity and external development priorities of a municipality. It is 
less physical and more process oriented. These features make the IDP a tool for 
systematic re-orientation of municipality management and the service delivery 
culture to the benefit of the communities being served. IDP aims to achieve co-
operative governance. LED is lifted out by legislation as a key area of this 
collaboration and co-ordination, hence the focus of this study. 
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2. Research design and methodology 
 
This study is an evaluation study (Mouton 2001:158) aimed at assessing the extent 
of co-operative governance in the implementation of the IDP process using LED as a 
focus area. It will be a theory-driven evaluation, which applies the tenets of “policy 
analysis”, “social learning”, “social reform” and “social mobilization” as the four main 
traditions of planning thought as elaborated by Friedmann in (Mandelbaum et. al. 
1996:17-28). Further reference will be made to post-modernism in planning 
(Harrison, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2001). The study will explore different perspectives on 
LED to establish an appropriate framework for evaluation and demarcation of the 
study’s conceptual parameters. 
 
The study requires hybrid data (Mouton 2001:158) in order to give a balanced view 
of the evidence. Such data will be gathered from practitioners in municipalities, 
provincial government and national departments. The sample is therefore chosen 
from the Eastern Cape’s forty-five municipalities, its provincial administration is 
divided into thirteen departments and the national government has thirty-five 
departments. Within each of these spheres of government the units of analysis will 
be the technical practitioner (i.e. LED and IDP professionals), a set of projects 
designed purposefully to foster co-operative governance in planning (e.g. SDIs, 
Urban Renewal Programmes) and the host institutions. Characteristics to be 
assessed shall be derived from defining features of co-operative governance, IDP 
and LED as well as legislative provisions guiding each of these processes. The study 
shall be a cross-sectional analysis of vertical and horizontal dimensions of the 
phenomena under scrutiny.  
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 The study utilized a set of three research tools as discussed below. The choice of 
tools attests to the largely qualitative nature of the study, however quantitative data 
will be utilized to corroborate qualitative evidence. Moreover, the choice of qualitative 
tools will enable the voices of practitioners to be conveyed about their experiences in 
planning and what they think should change.  
 
3.1. Document study 
The document study was simultaneously chronological, by school of thought, as well 
as by case study [or model]. This combination enabled a coverage of the subject at 
hand (Mouton, 2001:90-91). This particular tool was used to review key perspectives 
on co-operative governance, integrated development planning, local economic 
development and the South African development planning framework.  
 
3.2. Survey questionnaire 
Quantitative data was gathered specifically through looking at the following key 
themes:  
• The extent to which the various spheres of government collaborate in 
situational analyses; 
• The consistency of development vision, objectives and goals; 
• The level of consistency and co-ordination of strategies; 
• Coherence, support and consistency in programme and project 
implementation; 
• Budgeting and expenditure management in the life cycle of plans; and 
• Monitoring and evaluation frameworks. 
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On the basis of this exploration certain preliminary conclusions were drawn. These 
conclusions were then analysed and discussed with key respondents in in-depth 
interviews. This tool was circulated to at least forty percent of the municipalities of 
the Eastern Cape. This sample was randomly (Babbie, 1989:218) selected. 
 
3.3. Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
The above-mentioned themes were explored in the interviews. This tool enabled the 
study to bring the voices of the practioners to the fore. Insight into experiences of 
local development planning professionals shed more light on the trends found in the 
literature and documents that have been studied. The interviews reflected the 
reasoning behind certain applications of theory and guidelines to planning LED 
specifically.  A representative group of twenty respondents was targeted for 
interviews but only nine respondents, drawn from municipalities and provincial 
government of the Eastern Cape, were available at the time of the interviews. These 
respondents enabled the study to solicit coverage of the subject.  
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4. Findings: Presentation and discussion 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The Eastern Cape Province has forty-five municipalities. These consist of a 
single category-A or metropolitan municipality, six category-C or district 
municipalities and thirty-eight category-B or local municipalities.  
Municipal Breakdown by Category 
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Diag. 4.1.a: Total population analysis 
 
Out of the total population of forty-five municipalities, twelve were surveyed, i.e. 
(26.7%) of the total population. In this sample ten municipalities belong to 
category-B (83.3%) and two belong to category-C (16.7%).  
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  Diag. 4.1.b: Sample analysis 
 
This sample is representative of the total population. Category A is statistically 
insignificant because there is no other municipality to compare it with, thus it was not 
sampled. The investigation focused on co-operative governance in integrated 
development planning in LED. In this context the six components of integrated 
development planning were investigated. These categories include: 
a) Situational analyses; 
b) Vision, objectives and goals; 
c) Strategies; 
d) Programme and project implementation;  
e) Budgeting and expenditure; and 
f) Monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Before analysing findings in these categories, the study will look at the resource 
allocations for LED.  
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4.2. Financial Resources 
Category C Municipalities 
 
In this category Alfred Nzo (ANDM) and OR Tambo (ORTDM) district municipalities 
were surveyed. ANDM has two constituent category-B municipalities, whereas 
ORTDM has six constituent municipalities. These two municipalities account for 
about sixty percent of the Eastern Cape population. Equally they have the highest 
concentration of poverty. Consequently both have been prioritised by national 
government for significant development investment. The study found that ANDM has 
a LED budget of R 28 966 000 whereas ORTDM had a LED budget of R 1 000 000.  
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  Diag. 4.2. a:  District Council LED budget comparison 
 
The above diagram reveals highly differentiated resource allocation at category C- 
level. Whilst the legal responsibilities of the municipalities with respect to LED are 
similar, their resource allocations are very different.  
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Category-B municipalities 
The variations in the allocations made by municipalities are further revealed in 
the category-B municipalities. Below is a table of the category-B municipal 
allocations for LED. 
 
No.: Municipal Name LED Budget Amount (R) 
1 Inxuba Yethemba 1 741 080 
2 Umzimvubu 3 000 000 
3 Mbizana 5 400 000 
4 Ntabankulu 4 000 000 
5 Tsolwana 0 030 000 
6 Intsika Yethu 2 359 738 
7 Port St Johns 3 638 000 
8 Nyandeni 9 153 733 
9 Umzimkhulu  1 969 000 
10 Qaukeni 5 000 000 
Table1: Budget allocations for category-B municipalities 
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Diag. 4.2.b.: Budget allocations for category-B municipalities 
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LED budgeting patterns were highly differentiated. This could be indicating the 
differentiated understanding of the LED concept. In Tsolwana the LED budget is 
almost non-existent. In Nyandeni there is relatively high level LED budget 
allocation. This observation is confirmed by Phila Xuza (personal interview, 17 
October, 2004), who said: “LED is seen as a custodian of micro-projects and 
survivalist economic activity”. Her comment highlighted the conceptual challenge 
facing municipalities. She further concedes that this misunderstanding is 
entrenched by a conceptual dichotomy found nationally, where the DPLG sees 
LED in the same social development perspective whilst DTI views it from a purely 
business development perspective. These two departments should be 
collaborating instead of pursuing differing perspectives of LED.  
 
4.3. Human Resources 
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Diag.4.3 a: Comparison of LED personnel by district municipality 
The LED budget reflects the amount of work that the municipality intends doing. 
The number of employees responsible for LED is an indication of how the 
responsibilities for LED are spread in the municipalities. The diagram reveals that  
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ORTDM has a disproportionately high number of personnel relative to the budget 
it has for LED, assuming that ANDM has an adequate LED budget. Even with 
ANDM, it is doubtful that only six people can effectively plan, formulate strategy, 
ensure locality development, provide business development services, develop 
human resources, steer community-based economic and employment 
development as well as manage institutions for LED (Blakely 1994:48-63).  
 
 
No.: Municipal Name LED employees 
1 Inxuba Yethemba 25 
2 Umzimvubu 2 
3 Mbizana 2 
4 Ntabankulu 3 
5 Tsolwana 1 
6 Intsika Yethu 1 
7 Port St Johns 2 
8 Nyandeni 2 
9 Umzimkhulu  2 
10 Qaukeni 1 
 Table 2: LED personnel by category B municipality 
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   Diag. 4.3.b: LED personnel by category B municipality 
In both municipal categories there is a comparable allocation of personnel to 
LED. However, Inxuba Yethemba presents an anomaly because it is a small 
municipality and yet it has allocated a large percentage of its personnel to LED.  
 
In the case of other municipalities there is clearly an inadequate allocation of 
human resources for LED, either as a result of limited understanding of the 
multiple functions of LED or because of a lack of resources or both. It is the 
assertion of this study that the latter is more probable.  
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4.4. LED Budget vs LED Employees 
  
No.: Municipal Name LED Budget Amount (R) LED employees 
1 Inxuba Yethemba 1 741 080 25 
2 Umzimvubu 3 000 000 2 
3 Mbizana 5 400 000 2 
4 Ntabankulu 4 000 000 3 
5 Tsolwana 0 030 000 1 
6 Intsika Yethu 2 359 738 1 
7 Port St Johns 3 638 000 2 
8 Nyandeni 9 153 733 2 
9 Umzimkhulu  1 969 000 2 
10 Qaukeni 5 000 000 1 
   Table 3: LED budget vs LED employees 
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Diag. 4.4.: Comparison of LED budgets and personnel 
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Municipal budget and personnel for LED followed the same pattern except for 
Intsika Yethemba. In Tsolwana there seemed to be no real LED focus despite the 
legal obligation of the municipality. Overall, municipalities had very limited human 
and financial resources to drive LED. Even though the study does not purport to 
set the parameters for adequate resource allocation for LED, the above 
conclusion, which flows from the cited data, remains valid. 
 
4.5. Situational Analyses 
 
4.5.1. Involvement of other spheres of government in municipal situational analysis 
The diagram below shows that the Eastern Cape Provincial Administration 
(ECPA) is more involved in LED than national government. This could result in 
national policy and strategy not being fully integrated in LED. However, a senior 
provincial government official (Mama: personal interview, 17 October, 2004) 
explained that this involvement is defined by the allocation of financial resources 
from the provincial and national spheres to local government. This then results in 
a dominant role being played by these spheres. The contradiction though, she 
laments, is that the ECPA’s LED unit and other planning units in the various 
departments are not planning with municipalities. There is also a vivid absence of 
a co-ordination role from the Office of the Premier. She concludes: “Departments 
are not informed by any facts or data from the municipalities”. This picture flies in 
the face of development planning as good situational information and data are 
preconditions for good planning. 
 
A LED manager from Nkonkobe Municipality (Gwintsa: personal interview, 27 
October, 2004) interviewed in the study concurred and added that collaborative  
  59
planning was at the centre of efficiency. However, VCG is undermined by the 
lack of comprehensive planning instruments at all the spheres. According to this 
respondent all three spheres have significant limitations in data gathering for 
situational analyses. Situational analysis is not centralised thus resulting in a 
disarticulation of development planning occurring at the various spheres. This, in 
turn, results in poor decision-making. In addition, the respondent continued, there 
is a disjuncture between development planning and fiscal planning processes, 
resulting in the latter driving the former. This also leads to parallel prioritisation 
and resource allocation. What is surprising though, adds the respondent, were 
the adequacy of the legislative context and the limited functionality of 
collaborative planning. 
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 Diag. 4.5.1. Comparison of provincial and national government involvement 
Another senior LED official (Zakade: personal interview, 27 October, 2004) in the 
Office of the Premier corroborated these findings. Zakade argued that 
collaborative planning in government had emerged as an accident rather than a 
strategic choice. This resulted from a gap left by the Municipal Systems Act 
(2000), Chapter Five, which requires co-operation.  
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Provincial and national spheres have had no reference legislation except for the 
broad principles in the Constitution. In attempting to rectify this, there had been 
two significant developments, namely, the introduction of integrated development 
strategies like ISRDS and Urban Renewal Strategy (URS) from the Presidency 
and the introduction of the Inter-governmental Relations Bill (2004).  
 
Despite these efforts, Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) lamented, 
there was still a need for comprehensive planning instruments at the various 
spheres. Such instruments should offer a common planning data baseline for all 
development planning efforts. 
 
4.5.2. Tools utilized in situational analyses 
Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) makes the point that municipal 
planning templates prescribed by national government are complex and as such 
IDPs are “done for municipalities”. In cases where other spheres are involved, he 
explains, resources do not follow functions thus resulting in unfunded mandates. 
According to Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) the municipalities 
are in a difficult situation because they are the face of government with regard to 
development. This leads to a situation where communities continue to prioritise 
development programmes outside the mandate of the municipalities, although 
this wrong prioritisation by communities offers an opportunity for collaborative 
planning and it was not exploited.    
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  Diag. 4.5.2.: Tools used in situational analyses  
The diagram above shows that situational analysis was done through workshops 
driven by experts. This confirms Ntenjwa’s (personal interview, 17 October, 
2004) point about IDPs being done for municipalities. Even when provincial 
government attempts collaboration by sending officials, according to Ntenjwa, 
these officials are too junior and consequently add very little value, as they can’t 
take decisions on behalf of the other sphere. Another executive mayor (Somyo: 
personal interview, 29 October, 2004) concurred and maintained that this 
weakened planning. 
 
4.5.3. Effectiveness of the situational analyses tools 
A majority of municipalities, as can be seen below, considered these workshops 
to be effective. The researcher can also relate to this as personal involvement in 
IDP facilitation in at least four municipalities in the Eastern Cape has shown that 
both Councillors and managers expect consultants to develop the IDP for them 
and they just comment superficially, any attempt at fully engaging them was seen 
as shifting of responsibility by the expert to those who have ”paid” for the service.  
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Unfortunately this picture is not going to change soon as long as municipalities 
do not problematise their current modus operandi. 
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Diag. 4.5.3. Effectiveness of situational analyses tools 
Unless this is done soon, even the opportunity of local stakeholder involvement, 
which Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) rated “very high”, will wane. 
Somyo (personal interview, 29 October, 2004) concurred with Xuza on this point. 
At the district level the municipality was utilising planning forums for stakeholder 
participation. Somyo identified the stakeholders as being youth forums, South 
African Council of Churches (SACC) and the Eastern Cape Non-Governmental 
Organisations Coalition (ECNGOC). Somyo, however, exclaimed that the 
municipality received more input from white-owned business enterprises than 
from black-owned ones.  
 
Furthermore, parastatals also participated more actively in municipal planning. 
Mayor Somyo (personal interview, 29 October, 2004) singled out the participation 
of public co-corporations like Telkom and Eskom as well as tertiary education 
institutions as key to situational analyses. These institutions provided data and 
plans through quality research that complemented municipal research. It is clear  
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from the above that municipalities are quantitatively assessing effectiveness of 
tools. In other words, they believe that the greater the number of stakeholders 
participating in workshops, the more effective they are likely to be. However, 
there seems to be little appreciation of the quality of participation by these 
stakeholders.  
 
4.6. Vision, objectives and goals 
 
4.6.1. Consistency of key national policies with LED vision, objectives and goals 
The study found, as is shown below, that municipalities have given little 
consideration to a major national economic policy in the form of the GEAR and 
instead a provincial growth and development policy (PGDP) has been seen as 
more influential to local planning. Mama (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) 
concurred with this where she said the PGDP process was a positive 
development in policy alignment, but was quick to mention though, that: 
“Visioning done at the provincial level has left out the participation of local 
government”. Thus, it can be concluded that the PGDP process, whilst 
welcomed, had limitations with respect to municipal participation.  
 
Somyo (personal interview, 29 October, 2004) warned: “The fact that we have a 
multiplicity of planning centres should not negate the fact that we are a unitary 
state. Therefore, GEAR must permeate all strategies.” Xuza (personal interview, 
17 October, 2004) highlighted though, that provincial policy on LED is lagging 
behind national policy even though it is seen as being more consistent with 
municipal planning. The fact that municipalities consider the LED White Paper as 
the second most important policy for LED is important but not adequate.  
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Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) was worried that this policy was in 
draft form from 1999 to 2003, which meant that even nationally there was 
stagnation in policy thought. 
 
Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) contradicted Xuza’s (personal 
interview, 17 October, 2004) interpretation. Zakade (personal interview, 27 
October, 2004) asserted that there was no national vision, objectives and goals 
guiding development planning. Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) 
added that the power to co-ordinate the national vision was dispersed across the 
Presidency, Department of Provincial and Local Government, Department of the 
National Treasury, Department of Public Service and Administration as well as 
the Reserve Bank. Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) also argued 
that in a developmental state there was no need for a separation of the fiscal and 
monetary policy because both are critical drivers of development. Zakade 
(personal interview, 27 October, 2004) further argued that municipalities were 
simply driven by fiscal policy in their planning, hence the highly financial 
relationship between the various spheres. Another respondent from a local 
municipality concurred and added that the national sphere had introduced GEAR 
as an attempt to provide this vision. But this policy, Zakade (personal interview, 
27 October, 2004) concluded, undermined LED. The diagram below, which 
evaluates policies that are consistent with LED, corroborates this perspective. 
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  Diag.: 4.6.1. Policy consistency 
However, Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) makes the point, that 
some municipalities lack the capacity to understand national policies. Hence it is 
difficult for them to localise and this is seen in the irrelevance of economic by-
laws where they exist. The challenge therefore, according to Ntenjwa (personal 
interview, 17 October, 2004), is to build internal municipal capacity to understand 
these policies. However, Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) 
concludes, despite the seemingly poor alignment of policy objectives, where 
these spheres find cause for convergence they do align objectives. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that national and provincial spheres are “cherry-
picking” in their alignment efforts. This is seen where the municipality has 
economic drivers that are related to a national/provincial department’s 
programme, then there will be active involvement of that department. This 
constitutes opportunistic planning and will not lead to integration. Another 
respondent concluded that there continued to be a policy gap on building 
downstream and upstream economies. This results in a disarticulation of the  
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macro and micro economic objectives and a lack of “contextuality” in economic 
collaboration.  
 
4.6.2. Tools used for vision, objectives and goals 
The continued use of policy workshops is confirmed in the diagram below. 
Limited use of interviews is worrying considering the need for engaging national 
and provincial officials, who may not be available for attending workshops in 
each municipality. A methodological shift and a mix of planning tools used could 
have improved policy alignment.  
 
 
 Diag. 4.6.2.: Tools used for Vision, objectives and goals 
 
4.6.3. Tools used for stakeholder involvement 
Policy workshops continued to dominate as planning tools as shown by the 
diagram below. Local stakeholders seemed to be actively making sectoral 
submissions to the planning process, which is a tool that can enrich planning. In 
Mnquma, Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) observed, the tertiary 
education sector and business were very active in the development of the vision, 
objectives and goals. Mnquma Municipality adopted a dual strategy with respect 
to business, where business would participate directly in the multi-stakeholder  
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IDP forum and the municipality’s LED officer would participate in the local 
business chamber.  
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Diag. 4.6.3. Tools used for stakeholder involvement 
 
In Buffalo City, according to Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004), they 
expanded their stakeholder involvement by inviting some of the visitors to their 
LED projects. However, both Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) and 
Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) note, business’s participation is 
predicated by the existing or perceived economic benefits for this stakeholder. 
These tools, concluded another respondent, are not able to balance the relative 
power of stakeholders and to deal with compartmentalisation. This results in the 
non-empowerment of community-based stakeholders to drive development. 
 
4.6.4. The influence of national strategies on LED strategies 
The Eastern Cape Province is predominantly rural and thus the strong influence 
of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy over LED strategies 
(see diagram below). Mama (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) was quick to 
point out though, that the ISRDS’s influence is driven nationally with 
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management support from a quasi-NGO or quaNGO called the Independent 
Development Trust (IDT). 
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 Diag. 4.6.4. Alignment of LED and National Strategies 
Mama (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) noted that the provincial 
government is focused on operational detail rather than strategy alignment but 
municipalities require mentoring and support in strategy formulation. 
Respondents also highlighted the influence of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
strategy to their LED. This could be as a result of the limited technical and 
financial capacity in the public sector and consequently a relationship with the 
private sector attends to such weaknesses. It could also be as a result of the 
strong emphasis by national leaders on investor-led development. These 
possibilities were confirmed by the strong showing of SDIs and IDZs, which are 
essentially free-trade zones seeking to “crowd-in” investors into specific regional 
nodes and corridors.  
 
This study also found that the Urban Renewal Strategy least influences 
municipalities. This is interesting considering that municipal administrative  
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infrastructure is based in urban areas. The urban areas studied are largely 
dysfunctional. It is worrying to note that strategy formulation does not realise the 
centrality of reviving the urban centre for the efficient functionality of the rural 
economy. The urban node is the local market where goods and money exchange 
hands, banking occurs and access to external markets is made easier through 
infrastructure and yet there is no keen focus on a strategy that seeks to revive it. 
It can thus be concluded that URS has not been clearly linked to LED in the 
policy dialogue amongst the three spheres of government. This significant 
oversight on the part of these spheres further sets back co-operative 
governance.  
 
One other significant policy for LED is the Black Economic Empowerment 
strategy. This strategy seeks to provide previously disadvantaged individuals with  
economic opportunities. The strategy is driven by industry charters negotiated 
centrally with guidance from national government through targets set for each 
industry. The weak showing of the BEE strategy is worrying as it is one of the key 
strategies for economic development from the national government point of view. 
It is seen as the major policy instrument for integrating the different racial groups 
in the economic development path of the country.  
 
Despite the above observations, Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) 
believed that LED strategies were researched properly. Ntenjwa (personal 
interview, 17 October, 2004) said that there was indeed strategy alignment, 
although derived from the different planning and budgeting cycles of national and 
provincial government. Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) 
highlighted the centrality of the State Presidents’ annual “state of the nation”  
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address (made around February and March) in strategy alignment. Mama felt 
that more support and guidelines from the national sphere are urgently required  
to consolidate strategy alignment. Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004), 
on the other hand, believed that LED policy achieved this alignment of strategies. 
What Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) did see as a major challenge 
to strategy formulation, however, was the lack of analysis of local economic 
potential in LED strategies of municipalities.  
 
Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) warned that these strategies must 
be understood for what they are, namely “policy stop-gap measures” that are 
aimed at responding to specific consequences of the apartheid space economy. 
Invariably then they are short-term and cannot drive long-term economic 
development. Municipalities, Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) 
added, have used these to drive their LED strategies. Consequently, LED 
strategies are not driven by local conditions with the long-term perspective of the 
local sphere. The general lack of economic anchors or drivers, Zakade (personal 
interview, 27 October, 2004) concluded, expose this as the Achilles heel of LED 
strategy. Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) added that there 
existed a pervasive lack of balance in economic strategies between import 
substitution industrialisation, which is critical for endogenous economic strategies  
required in LED, and export oriented industrialisation. This imbalance results in 
weak LED strategies. Weak LED strategies in turn do not create an environment 
conducive for business growth. 
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4.6.5. Tools used to co-ordinate strategies between the three spheres of government 
The diagram below reveals the continued reliance on policy workshops but also 
an increased use of experts. It was also observed that there is a shrinking use of  
interviews and submissions as planning tools when co-ordinating strategies. This 
indicated and re-affirmed the limited engagement of provincial and national 
officers in planning.  
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 Diag. 4.6.5.: Tools used in strategy co-ordination 
 
4.6.6. Effectiveness of the co-ordination tools 
 
Most of the municipalities interviewed came to the conclusion that strategy co-
ordination tools were ineffective. It must be noted that there was a significant 
number of municipalities that saw them as effective. Overall there seemed to be 
a need to improve co-ordination of economic development strategies between 
different spheres through a use of multiple-planning tools, for example, a 
development strategy may have guidelines for local, provincial and national 
planning that ensure co-ordination vertically and horizontally. 
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 Diag. 4.6.6.: Effectiveness of co-ordination tools 
 
4.6.7. The level of participation by the local role-players 
The diagram below indicates a medium to high level of participation by local role-
players. This positive observation reflects the active interest shown by local role-
players in the IDP process. Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) 
indicated that participation came in the form of representative forums. However, 
Ntenjwa’s (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) concern was the extent of 
opportunities’ gate keeping happening at these forums, where forum members’ 
interests dominated those of the broader community they represented. Gwintsa  
(personal interview, 27 October, 2004) also conceded that these workshops were 
failing to consider the overall strategic direction of municipalities. 
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  Diag. 4.6.7: Level of stakeholder participation in strategy co-ordination 
 
Despite high levels of participation, there seems to be a need to interrogate 
further the quality of this participation. Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 
2004), noted that there is no effective participation of local stakeholders in 
strategy co-ordination thus resulting in an expert-driven process. Gwintsa further 
argued that municipalities, by following this approach, neglected creative 
strategies adopted by communities. Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 
2004) made an example of a Mlumbi family that has resuscitated economic 
development in a village in Keiskammahoek through reviving a farm. This 
example, Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) argued, shows the 
ability of the community to use organic advantages of their environment in 
developing economic strategies. Gwintsa concluded that local stakeholders 
remain spectators in this process.  
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4.7. Programme and project implementation 
4.7.1. Collaboration in implementation of economic programmes and projects 
Sixty six (66%) percent of the twelve municipalities interviewed indicated that 
there is no collaboration in programme and project implementation amongst the 
three spheres of government. A senior provincial Treasury official (Magalela: 
personal interview, 25 October, 2004) said that this was not suprising as national 
and provincial spheres are not active in programme and project implementation. 
This was worsened, according to Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 
2004), by the lack of a common programme management guide for all the 
spheres. Equally problematic is the fact that the national and provincial spheres 
have delegated “unfunded mandates” to municipalities. “Unfunded mandates” 
refer to functions that belong to another sphere, which are performed by another 
on an agency basis without the transfer of the necessary resources. This has led 
the different spheres litigating against each other, suffering public 
embarrassment in the process. The national sphere is seen as a key culprit in 
this regard. 
 
According to Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004), national 
government just “parachutes” programmes without any collaborative thinking. 
Development targets are not set as a co-ordinated effort between province and 
the municipalities. Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004) argued that 
co-ordination was made impossible by competition and turf-wars amongst line 
departments and the different spheres respectively.  
 
Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) said that a significant gap in 
programme collaboration between the different spheres results from a lack of  
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capacity to implement project management tools such as work breakdown 
structure, Gantt chart and total quality management. These are some project 
management instruments that potentially can improve programme collaboration. 
This gap undermined collaborative programme implementation. This meant that 
programme failure cannot be identified during implementation and that resulted in 
resource wastage. A series of examples can be found in housing projects that 
are incomplete or whose houses collapse shortly after completion and yet full 
payment is made.  
 
Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) maintained that a bottom-up 
attempt at programme integration is visible in his municipality, Mnquma. Mnquma 
was able to achieve this through the spatial development framework. Ntenjwa 
(personal interview, 17 October, 2004) re-asserted that the upper spheres are 
driven by their interests and not local priorities. Somyo (personal interview, 29 
October, 2004) concurred by highlighting attempts made by ECPA and national 
government to create structures for collaborative programme implementation. 
Provincially the former Premier, Reverend Arnold Makhenkesi Stofile, formed a 
co-ordinating forum on which mayors sat with the Premier. In addition to this, 
there is MuniMEC, which is a forum of the members of the Executive Council 
(MECs) and Local Government councillors and mayors. National departments 
with offices in the provinces have also been active in co-ordinating programmes 
through this mechanism. 
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Diag. 4.7.1: Collaboration in programme implementation 
Mama (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) concurs with the above position: 
“There is weak collaboration in programme and project management. The 
relations in this regard are adhoc and haphazard. National and provincial 
government are just transferring funds to local municipalities”. Xuza (personal 
interview, 17 October, 2004) again concluded that it was easier in Buffalo City to 
achieve horizontal collaboration than vertical. 
 
This study has, through the above finding, discovered a significant development 
planning weakness in the South African model. It is not possible to ensure that 
programmes achieve policy and development objectives set by upper spheres if 
there is no collaboration with the local sphere and indeed amongst spheres. 
Simultaneously, even when the relationship is primarily financial, it is impossible 
to do proper financial monitoring without active involvement in collaborative 
programme and project management. Programme and project management 
require collaborative monitoring and evaluation if performance were to be 
improved. 
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4.7.2. Type of resources shared by the three spheres 
 
The diagram below confirms what the study has uncovered, which is the 
dominance of the finance variable in the relationship between the three spheres. 
The strong showing of human resource as a shared resource is inconsistent with 
the previous findings as well as with the findings of this study. This showed the 
selective involvement of upper personnel in programmes that are priorities of the 
department and not necessarily of the municipalities. A worrying observation was 
the lack of sharing of equipment between the three spheres. Effective 
development planning in a context of limited resources like the Eastern Cape 
requires achievement of economies of scale. This is significant because not all 
municipalities could afford to buy, operate and maintain equipment for 
development planning. 
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 Diag. 4.7.2. Resource sharing between different spheres 
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4.7.3. Resource sharing between the municipality and local role-players 
Eighty three percent (83%) of the municipalities interviewed highlighted 
information sharing as the key resource shared with local role-players. About 
67% of the municipalities polled in this study ranked human resources as the 
second most shared resource with local role-players. Finance was the third most 
shared resource, which means different from the inter-governmental relationship, 
the local government and local role-players’ relationship was not dominated by 
finance. The findings, shown below, indicate a more multi-faceted relationship in 
HCG. This is a more balanced developmental relationship than the vertical one. 
Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) concurred with these findings 
saying that in his municipality local role-players were part of the auditing and 
remuneration committees. Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) was 
nevertheless concerned that in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) local role-
players were not active. Xuza (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) thought that 
this worked in Buffalo City because they focused on City Governance rather than 
the municipality consulting role-players.  
 
Some of the respondents noted that communities had no capacity to engage with 
programme management. In many instances their involvement has led to the 
slowing down of programme implementation. Consequently, the respondents 
argued, there was structural rather than functional involvement of local role-
players. This meant that LED saw the formation of community trusts, 
representation in Boards of Directors and management structure with minimal 
contribution to the content of the discussions that took place in the programmes. 
This then calls to question the quality of the participation of role-players in 
resource sharing. Related to this is the fair distribution of benefits of these  
  79
programmes to the local role-players. 
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4.7.3. Resource sharing with local role-players 
 
The City Governance of Buffalo City included weekly LED working sessions. In 
these sessions the municipality and role-players, like financial institutions, 
business mentors and IDZ representatives, set up LED one-stop centres where 
applications from entrepreneurs would be processed and where they could be 
advised about available opportunities. A similar approach was utilised in the 
Nkonkobe District, where the municipality initiated significant LED projects and 
called upon local business to partner with it on various projects. PPPs such as 
these, according to Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004), have 
resulted in the revival and expansion of the Citrus belt, investment in a major golf 
estate and a spring water plant in Nkonkobe. This approach resulted in a more 
organic process in which role-players derived direct benefit from collaborative 
planning. It is clear from these findings that the VCG has some lessons to learn 
from HCG. 
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4.7.4. Areas of co-operation in project implementation that require improvement 
Asked what areas overall they thought should be improved in programme and 
project implementation, the municipalities highlighted finance, human resources, 
performance standards and technology applications as shown in the diagram 
below. Municipalities are yearning for a more rounded relationship in programme 
and project implementation. It goes without saying that improved implementation 
will lead to improved development planning. 
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 Diag. 4.7.4. Areas to be improved in implementation 
 
Respondents interviewed added that these areas were a problem because of 
bureaucratic inertia. The lack of intra- and inter-departmental development 
communication results in disjointed actions at the municipal level. 
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4.8. Budgeting and expenditure management 
 
4.8.1. Areas of better LED inter-governmental co-operation 
The study found that the relationship between the three spheres is essentially 
financial. In a nutshell it is a “resources down reports up” relationship (Magalela: 
personal interview, 25 October, 2004). This finding is corroborated by the fact 
that the majority of municipalities in this study saw reporting as the main area of 
inter-governmental co-operation. It is a statutory requirement that municipalities 
must report to National Treasury on the tenth day of each month. At provincial 
level municipalities have to report to the transferring department. This reporting 
process, according to Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004), was not 
effective. Monthly reports are supposed to be used as monitoring tools but don’t 
fulfil this function due to the inefficiency of the process.  
 
In addition, Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004) commented, that the 
provincial transferring department was supposed to visit programmes they are 
funding but they don’t, and this undermined expenditure management for 
example in some financial years this has resulted in about 60% under-spending 
of programme funds. Consequently, it resulted in funds being diverted to other 
uses at the municipal level. An example of this is the use of funds meant for 
personnel programmes such as bonuses for Councillors. The situation is also 
complicated by the lack of a common and simple reporting system. In addition to 
this, municipalities and the other spheres have non-aligned financial information 
systems. According to Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004), despite 
revenue mobilisation coming second as an area of better co-operation, there are 
significant challenges facing municipalities. Municipalities are supposed to  
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generate their own revenue on the one hand and on the other national 
government has a duty of annually providing funds through the national fiscus, as 
gazetted in the Division of Revenue Act (DORA). In addition the national sphere 
prioritises national objectives or programmes by allocating grants (e.g. 
infrastructure grant). 
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 Diag. 4.8.1. Level of inter-governmental co-operation in LED financing 
The ECPA has similar grants that are allocated to the local sphere and these are 
also gazetted. Theoretically, Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004) 
added, there is supposed to be an agreement between local government and 
either of these spheres.  Municipalities in turn are supposed to integrate these 
resources into their budgets. However, national and provincial governments do 
not engage municipalities for this purpose. These transfers, especially in 
provinces, are delayed thus undermining development planning and its outcomes 
such as infrastructure development. Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 
2004) noted that the revenue generated at municipal level was split amongst the 
three spheres to the disadvantage of the local sphere. Magalela (personal 
interview, 25 October, 2004) believed that the principles of inter-governmental  
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fiscal framework were not implemented.  
 
4.8.2. Rating inter-governmental financial co-operation 
The study also found that there was a medium rating of inter-governmental 
financial co-operation. This could be due to the fact that there were efforts at 
improving the situation, albeit through structural intervention. Some respondents 
though, noted that this rating reflected the lack of a relationship between 
provincial expenditure and LED expenditure. 
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Diag.4.8.2.: Rating of Inter-Governmental Financial Co-operation 
Godongwana, a former Provincial Treasury MEC, (personal interview, 31 
October, 2004) made the point though, that “The nature of these relations is 
based on the powers allocated to each sphere. National government is the tax 
collector and therefore the dominant sphere”. However, Godongwana (personal 
interview, 31 October, 2004) continued and said that there will always be contest 
about the best point of service delivery and therefore resources. In a nutshell, 
Godongwana (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) concluded the point; there 
will always be a “cordial-conflictual” relationship. Another senior manager from  
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the provincial Department of Public Works (Fekisi: Personal interview, 25 
October, 2004) concurred with Godongwana’s line of argument by making an 
example regarding the municipal infrastructure grant. Municipalities in the 
province budgeted R800 million and ECPA budgeted R400m for the expanded 
public works programme. There was no link between these two allocations and 
the result was that municipalities, as the physical space for implementing the 
programme, could not plan for the R1,2 billion allocated to the programme. 
Gwintsa and Zakade (personal interviews, 27 October, 2004) argue that the poor 
relations found in development planning are reflected in financial management.  
 
Gwintsa and Zakade (personal interviews, 27 October, 2004) went further to 
assert that the provincial and national government undermine the legal and social 
integrity of the municipalities by the lack of strategic allocation of resources to 
LED. Godongwana (personal interview, 31 October, 2004) concurred by making 
a reference to the inter-governmental budget forum. This is a forum where 
budget priorities are discussed. Godongwana (personal interview, 31 October, 
2004) indicated that “local government participates in this process at the tail end 
because of the design of the process”. Consequently, municipalities are not 
getting adequate benefit from the budget forum. This, Gwintsa and Zakade 
(personal interviews, 27 October, 2004) further argued, resulted in non-
expenditure or mis-expenditure by provincial and national government.  
 
Horizontally, departments were actively involved in discussing priorities with the 
municipality through a local inter-governmental forum. This forum, according to 
Magalela (personal interview, 25 October, 2004), was successful in Alfred Nzo 
District Municipality as provincial departments represented in that municipal area  
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actively participated in the inter-governmental forum. Still, having the Office of the  
Premier (OtP) playing an active role in municipal planning could improve this. 
Magalela argued that there must be purposeful and co-ordinated planning and 
resource management. This study found that the local sphere was territorial in 
their functioning thus making it difficult to achieve the required levels of co-
operation. Consequently there was no consensus on roles and responsibilities 
between the different spheres.  
 
4.8.3. LED expenditure level 
The interviews conducted with municipalities revealed that there was high LED 
expenditure. About 92% of the municipalities spent between 50 and 100% of 
their LED budget. The low levels of budget allocation and human resources 
responsible for LED undermine these expenditure levels. 
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 Diag. 4.8.3.: LED expenditure level 
Godongwana (personal interview, 31 October 2004) understood this and justified 
it by saying that “it must be remembered that South African municipalities are still 
at a formative stage”. Although this may be true, the level of economic and social  
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deprivation requires much more significant allocation of funds to LED. 
 
Furthermore, municipalities are battling with administrative issues. It was only in 
2004 that Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality issued a capital bond. The 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality is investigating the appropriate incentives 
for promoting industrialisation. The Buffalo City Municipality has just identified tax 
concession zones for industrial promotion and these have been submitted to 
National Treasury for approval. These, Godongwana (personal interview, 31 
October 2004) concluded, indicate that the bulk of municipalities have limited 
capacity to raise LED revenue and spend accordingly. 
 
4.8.4. Areas of local stakeholder involvement 
The diagram below shows that a majority of municipalities have high stakeholder 
and role-player participation in expenditure planning and reporting. This confirms 
earlier findings where it was discovered that the local stakeholders and role-
players are highly involved in municipal implementation.  
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 Diag. 4.8.4. Stakeholder and roleplayer participation in LED finances 
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4.9. Monitoring and Evaluation 
4.9.1. Inter-Governmental co-operation in LED Monitoring and Evaluation 
Half of the municipalities surveyed felt that there was inter-governmental co-
operation in LED monitoring and evaluation and the other half felt there was not. 
The evidence is inconclusive. Some of the respondents interviewed felt 
government was not measuring the “right things”. Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 
October, 2004) argued that government was focusing on outputs rather than 
outcomes. Outputs refer to quantifiable goals such as the number of houses built 
or the kilometres of road tarred. Outcomes refer to qualitative goals such as the 
improvement in the quality of life as a result of having a house. Government 
reacted instead of focusing on early warning signs and that resulted in poor 
timing of interventions from the upper spheres. Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 
October, 2004) found that attempts at monitoring and evaluation lacked strategic 
and creative thinking, and were in fact mechanistic and rigid. Despite this 
quantitative and mechanistic focus, operational management tools of government 
were lacking a monitoring and evaluation system. Ntenjwa (personal interview, 
17 October, 2004) maintained that monitoring and evaluation instruments were 
seen as punitive measures. 
 
Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) argued though, that on the 
contrary the performance management system, as a monitoring and evaluation 
tool, has been successful and has improved operational management. Zakade 
(personal interview, 27 October, 2004) concluded though, that there was poor 
focus on productivity and organisational culture in the current monitoring and 
evaluation system, which resulted in a disjuncture.  
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Another tool that was heralded as a good example by Somyo (personal interview, 
29 October, 2004) was the district mayors’ forum, which focused on monitoring 
implementation of the IDP. Somyo (personal interview, 29 October, 2004) 
complained that this tool was not replicated at a local level. In addition to this the 
district municipality was conducting spot visits to projects as a monitoring 
mechanism. Somyo (personal interview, 29 October, 2004) further argued that all 
the spheres benefited from monitoring done through portfolio committees of the 
legislature as well as customer care services of municipalities. 
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 Diag. 4.9.1. Inter-Governmental co-operation in LED M&E  
Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) maintained that monitoring and 
evaluation was suffering from a lack of capacity and development information to 
give the required feedback. This lack of capacity was partially a product of the 
variety and incoherence of monitoring and evaluation systems. In addition 
municipalities lacked the capacity to absorb monitoring and evaluation 
information. 
 
4.9.2. Local stakeholder participation in LED M&E 
Equally, half of the municipalities surveyed felt that there was adequate local 
stakeholder participation in LED monitoring and evaluation. Participation in 
internal audit committees, as reflected by Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17  
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October, 2004), is an example of this involvement. Mama (personal interview, 17 
October, 2004) warned though about a need to clarify roles and responsibilities in 
monitoring and evaluation. 
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  Diag. 4.9.2. Local stakeholder participation in LED M&E 
 
4.9.3. Areas of improvement in LED Monitoring and Evaluation for effective co-operative 
governance 
Respondents from municipalities surveyed were asked to identify areas of 
improvement in monitoring and evaluation and these areas were pre-selected. All 
of the areas identified in the quantitative questionnaire were seen as requiring 
improvement. This is a reflection of an overall weak monitoring and evaluation 
process. 
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Diag. 4.9.3. LED improvements required 
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5. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
This study has discussed several features of co-operative governance in South 
Africa. This chapter draws conclusions based on these and recommendations 
are then made.  
 
5.1. Conclusions 
Co-operative governance requires mutual understanding as the basis for co-
ordination of functions. This mutual understanding is derived from inclusive 
decision-making. The distribution of decision-making powers, channels of 
communication and procedures for roles and functions are the operational tools 
of co-operative governance. The process is both vertical and horizontal and it 
can be summarised as represented in the diagram below. 
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 Diag.5.1. South African co-operative governance model 
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Within government co-operative governance was managed through inter-
governmental co-operation processes and procedures. The objectives of inter-
governmental co-operation among the three spheres of governance were: 
• achieving coherence, 
• providing assistance to lower spheres, 
• co-ordinating of efforts, 
• sharing information with each other, 
• consulting each other on policy, programmes and projects, and 
• supporting each other’s efforts. 
If achieved, these objectives would lead to better feedback, information sharing 
and co-ordination. On the other hand government, business and community 
structures were supposed to collaborate in agenda setting, policy formulation and 
implementation. The collaboration was supposed to result in the objectives noted 
above. Collaboration occurred horizontally through structures like NEDLAC, 
Provincial Growth and Development Planning conferences and IDP forums. These 
were institutions set up by government to foster constitutional principles of co-
operative governance. They had also crystallized a social compact for the 
development of South Africa. The key conclusion of this study is that the entire 
system is not working in terms of integrated development planning in South Africa 
– as evidenced by the Eastern Cape because of the domination of the national 
sphere. 
 
This domination is a product of the fact that those who design tools for co-
operation control the process of co-operative governance. In the case of South 
Africa the national sphere designs these tools. Consequently, they dominate the 
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process, hence the “top-down” and government-centred co-operative governance 
that prevails in the country. This conclusion flows from the views from key 
respondents. Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 October, 2004) specifically 
highlighted the complexity of the instruments designed and provided by the 
national sphere for integrated development planning. This resulted in IDPs being 
done for municipalities rather than by municipalities. Evidence from the surveyed 
municipalities corroborated this, as it revealed that experts largely drove the 
planning process. Other respondents felt that there was ascending control of 
financial resources with the higher structures. In other words, the provincial 
sphere had more power than local sphere and the national sphere had more than 
the provincial.  
 
It can be concluded too that municipalities were not proactive in asserting their 
role of directing planning and adapting planning tools to fit their context. The 
ironical by-product of this process was the weakness of co-operative governance 
in the lower spheres and thus centralised governance. Centralised governance 
carried the risk of alienating the national sphere from its lower spheres. One may 
ask, why this is the case when the South African Constitution (1996) defines 
characteristics and modus operandi of government in co-operative governance as 
inclusive of planning, design and implementation of policies?  
 
A major discovery, though, is that the development-planning environment in 
government is dominated by financial control. Financial control is centralised at 
National Treasury. National Treasury, through the PFMA, theoretically devolves 
financial management to lower spheres and horizontally to managers. However, 
templates for strategic planning, budgeting and integrated development planning 
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are designed with the approval of National Treasury. Before the approval of 
departmental plans and municipal IDPs, National Treasury provides budget 
allocations within which all of the plans must be made. Then national departments 
make allocations for national priorities and set aside specific grants for assisting 
municipalities in these areas. Provincial governments then follow the same 
approach. Later municipalities have to align their IDPs with the above spheres. By 
this time the municipalities have confined planning space. If they plan outside this 
scope their IDPs will be non-implemented. In the case of the Eastern Cape about 
90% of the municipalities have no capacity to generate their own revenue. In six of 
the nine provinces, this situation is similar. Left totally dependent on the upper 
spheres, municipalities are powerless in the development-planning context.  
 
Hence the conclusion that formal allocation of powers and functions is inadequate. 
Formal power can either be enhanced or undermined by informal power networks. 
Such networks go beyond government structures and may be more powerful than 
government when it comes to the delivery of goods and services. Therefore, 
government is challenged to use its legitimate power position to lead beyond and 
guide the networks outside its system. However, elite networks, it has been found, 
tend to distort reality and mask poverty. This they do by creating spaces and 
institutions that fake equality in income, access and the ability to participate. An 
example of this is found in the shopping malls that they create where all 
consumers are given the impression of being equal participants in the economy. 
This theoretical finding flows from and is supported by the points made by Somyo 
(personal interview, 29 October, 2004) and Ntenjwa (personal interview, 17 
October, 2004) about the dominance of white businesses in IDP processes. The 
literature suggests that businesses participate in LED with a view to influencing 
  95
planning decisions in their own favour. Note for instance that a reading of Xuza’s 
(personal interview, 17 October, 2004) comments about the active role played by 
big business in Buffalo City in LED is also consistent with this conclusion. 
However, another conclusion that can be drawn from Somyo’s (personal 
interview, 29 October, 2004) interview is that those who are organised tend to 
participate more, as was and is the case with the network of churches and non-
governmental organisations. Equally these networks, as theory suggests, 
complemented formal government power. The role of government then is to 
highlight the inequality whilst promoting and implementing strategies that target 
poverty.  
 
The study has found that in the western countries such as the US and UK LED 
has focussed on competition for private investment. It also included mobilisation 
of human capital and privatisation. Privatisation strategies included forming 
Public Private Partnership (PPP), location of new firms in distressed areas, and 
analysis of economic feasibility of development projects. The municipalities 
surveyed in the study have also revealed their preference of PPPs as a LED 
strategy. In western countries LED entailed the movement away from statist 
development planning and government regulation towards government as an 
enabler. Their targets for LED entail job creation, skills development, promotion 
of enterprising activities and provision of appropriate infrastructure for business 
development. This is different to South Africa by a lack of focus on land 
restitution and Black Economic Empowerment.   
 
In Latin America, LED was anchored on building nodes for exporting raw materials 
and minerals. It established linkages between the export sector, the consumer 
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market and a growing labour force. Their strategies included technical and capital 
intensive farming and free-trade zones. Government offered infrastructure and 
services. Therefore, government played a supportive role and the business was 
central to LED. The study has found similarities between this particular LED model 
and the SDIs and IDZs in South Africa. It was also observed that it was ranked as 
the third most important strategy by the municipalities surveyed in this study as 
opposed to ISRDS. However, Gwintsa (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) 
concluded that LED needed more Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) than 
export-oriented strategies. Another conclusion that could be drawn from this is the 
fact that the Eastern Cape is predominantly rural and therefore their LED 
perspective will be dominated by rural development. 
 
The African model revealed that high unemployment and domination of the 
informal sector are the key challenges of LED. Africa experienced urbanisation 
without employment. Consequently production systems could not cope with 
urbanisation and urban management. The central government played a key role in 
managing investment and urban development. In East Africa central government 
promoted industrial estates, distribution of loans to industrial and processing 
establishments, modern technology, infrastructure development, power and 
extension of services. West African communes have power to intervene in 
economic and social development but they do not. This was found to be 
consistent with the surveyed municipalities as they displayed little regard for urban 
management by the down ranking of the Urban Renewal Strategy (URS). It was 
revealed that national government in West Africa was more responsible for urban 
regeneration than the municipalities, which was a worrying trend.  
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In other words, even where the local sphere has been given powers to intervene 
in LED they do not. Instead the African model revealed that the informal sector 
attended to urban housing and employment creation. It re-configured the city into 
multi-nuclei of de-concentrated production and service activities. Key elements of 
this model include the use of indigenous resources, family enterprises, labour 
intensive skills and competitive markets. It also focuses on poverty alleviation and 
eradication. Strategies used in this regard included shelter provision, land 
management, micro-enterprises, urban agriculture, commodity trading and 
vending, service provision and credit mobilisation. The biggest challenge to the 
African LED model was the complex land management model. It included 
leasehold, freehold and customary systems. Therefore, the informal sector 
complemented central government in LED. However, both are hampered by rapid 
population growth.  
 
Like elsewhere in Africa, the South African LED model is premised on the land 
challenge. The South African model seeks to achieve long-term security of land 
tenure. Land and rural development policies regulate conditions of residence on 
certain land, conditions and circumstances for termination of tenure and land 
eviction. Therefore, there is more clarity on land management issues in South 
Africa’s model of LED. This is important for investors in LED. Sectors highlighted 
for LED, especially in the rural context, include agriculture, forestry, tourism, rural 
industries, SMMEs, financial services and labour intensive programmes. The 
model also highlights the objective of social stability and increasing local capacity 
to plan and implement rural development. There was also a focus on building 
viable institutions, accessible social amenities, and developing skills and 
knowledge. 
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LED in South Africa has adopted a nodal approach to development planning. 
There has been a shift towards demand-driven development expenditure. This 
direction was taken after the intervention of the President’s Office, which was 
worried about incoherent planning. Zakade (personal interview, 27 October, 2004) 
noted that these were just policy “stop-gap” measures due to a lack of policy 
provisions. The intervention also focused on institutional development. Human 
resources development support, technical support through NGOs as well as 
national and provincial departments were the key institutional support 
mechanisms. Other strategies instituted by this intervention were safety nets, local 
partnerships, SMME promotion, infrastructure development, policy and procedure 
revision by municipalities, provision of special economic services and municipal 
service partnerships. 
 
The Local Government White Paper (1996) and the Municipal Systems Act (2000) 
were central to defining the IDP process. Co-operative governance was 
highlighted as the key objective of these policies. LED also featured strongly as 
one of the mechanisms of planning and managing economic development in the 
municipal space. The IDP had the following components: situational analysis, 
visioning, strategy formulation, programme planning as well as a monitoring, 
evaluation and review. The IDP legislation isolated LED as a key area for co-
operative governance. The conclusion of the study in this regard is that there was 
a convincing policy and legislative context to achieve co-operative governance in 
IDP (LED). However, IDP practice and overwhelming evidence from municipalities 
and resource interviewees pointed to a dis-functionality of the co-operative 
governance model in IDP (LED). This was revealed from the differentiated 
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resourcing of LED right up to how municipalities monitor, evaluate and review 
IDPs. In LED, specifically, the study found, there seems to be no nationally 
coherent policy. Experts who use the workshop medium for engaging local 
stakeholders dominated IDP. The central flaw of this technique was argued in the 
theory section, which was its fallacious assumption of equality among 
stakeholders. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
Co-operative governance in development planning in LED in South Africa needs 
urgent rethink and reform. The recommendations of the study are divided into 
three areas namely policy, management and organisation.  
 
5.2.1. Co-operative Development Planning4 policy 
Despite there being a plethora of legislation and policies that profess to promote 
co-operative development planning, the reality is they are inadequate. It is 
recommended that the three government spheres must synthesize existing policy 
with the objective of streamlining it. Various provisions need to be made 
consistent through integration into a singular guiding framework. The framework 
needs to prioritise key areas of co-operation. A mechanism also needs to be put 
in place for monitoring best practice so that the framework is continuously 
refined. Below are some of the suggested elements of this singular guiding 
framework.  
 
The vision for co-operative development planning must be underpinned by the 
principle of contextuality. Contextuality refers to the centrality of local conditions 
                                             
4 Stands for co-operative governance in development planning. 
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to co-operative development planning. Its benefit lies in the appreciation of the 
unique features of each locality and its development opportunities. Particularly in 
LED, contextuality ensures use of the comparative advantages of each area for 
its economic development. It also facilitates flexibility and adaptability of 
development planning. Contextuality also allows development-planning 
strategies across sectors to be relevant to existing problems and they are not 
foreign to local stakeholders either.  
 
This vision must also encapsulate effective management of power networks. By 
planning networks the study refers to those power networks that have no primary 
or secondary interest in the planning processes, but, who in the conduct of their 
business, can undermine development planning. Differentiation in the 
management is vital as they carry different capacities, threats and resources. 
Central to development planning is the ability of the government to stretch its 
limited resources by utilizing resources of power networks and neutralizing 
networks with negative agendas. Therefore, this calls for consistent power 
network analysis and engagement beyond the IDP cycle.  
 
Closely associated with the management of networks is the management of 
stakeholders. Stakeholders refer to groupings that have an interest in the 
development planning process. The study recommends that the vision should 
highlight differentiated engagement of stakeholders. Non-uniformity of 
stakeholder capacity, skills, interests and influence are reason enough for the 
differentiated engagement of stakeholders. Differentiated engagement for 
purposes of IDP entails arranging different forums for different stakeholders and 
applying varied techniques for effective participation. 
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It is recommended that the vision must continue with the focus on poverty 
eradication through acknowledging the centrality of the informal sector to 
development planning. Many of the municipalities in South Africa are unable to 
improve their revenue position because of grinding poverty of their citizens. 
These citizens are fast relying on the informal sector, which is consistent with the 
African experience. That is not to say the informal sector is weak. However, most 
of the poverty is structural, and because of structural constraints the informal 
sector can be by-passed. Any poverty eradication strategy must be guided by the 
vision of learning from and supporting the informal sector. Learning from the 
informal sector may require in-depth research into how they organise themselves 
and what can be beneficiary to development planning. 
 
Co-operative development planning policy must incorporate sustainability in its 
vision. Sustainability is currently a “buzz-word” and this study seeks to highlight 
the duality of meaning, which sees sustainability as environmental sensitivity and 
as the institutional capability to manage development planning processes and 
strategies. This understanding allows the three spheres to avoid “white elephant” 
projects like expanded public works projects such as clinics without nurses and 
medication, schools without desks, and multi-purpose community centres that 
are being vandalised because of non-utilisation.  
 
The new vision for co-operative development planning must incorporate the 
principle of enterprising municipalities. Municipalities need to use their assets for 
revenue generation. This will fast track their financial independence and 
therefore bolster their role in co-operative development planning. This is not to 
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accept as fair the current domination over them (municipalities) by those spheres 
with more financial resources. It is true that the ability of the municipality to use 
its assets creatively puts it at a more powerful position in brokering development 
planning. Municipal Service Partnerships (MSPs) set a good policy foundation for 
this orientation but it is not sufficient.  
  
Co-operative development planning policy must explicitly promote 
decentralisation in its vision. Evidence in this study has shown that the upper 
spheres often has little knowledge of or appreciation for local conditions. Hence 
they force their development priorities through municipal planning processes. 
Decentralisation will result in real capacity building, as municipalities will 
determine development priorities for the province and the country. This will result 
in bottom-up development planning processes. National fiscus will divide revenue 
according to municipal needs, emerging regional trends and national policy 
priorities emerging in the regions. That will invert the current process, where 
national government determines priorities, the provinces follow, and 
municipalities come only at the end. 
 
This study recommends a policy mission based on the above vision. The policy’s 
mission must ensure that financial management follows development plans. This 
is logical because no planning process ever starts by measuring its human, 
physical and financial resources. Instead, the starting point is assessing the 
development challenges and then identifying the required resources to achieve 
those goals. It is a planning prerogative to mobilise resources for development 
plans, instead of limiting these to available resources. The significance of this 
shift is that it reverses the dominance of fiscal policy over development policy. 
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Effective development policy implementation will lead to bigger revenue and 
therefore sustained fiscal health.  
 
Sustained fiscal health and effective development planning require urgent 
investment in human capital in the municipalities. This recommendation 
acknowledges current efforts by government to build skills through the National 
Skills Development Strategy (NSDS). Resources need to be set aside for 
deepening the skills base in co-operative development planning and 
development management. This continues to be an area of weakness amongst 
many of the municipalities of South Africa. Human capital development is not and 
cannot continue as an endogenous process. Co-operative development planning 
requires skilled communities, more especially in LED. Community skills 
development requires a robust exogenous skills development strategy guided by 
the IDP.  
 
Equally, the mission of co-operative development planning should continue the 
focus on infrastructural development. Infrastructural development must be based 
on the IDP and not parachuted by the national and provincial departments. A 
shift from a bias on social infrastructure to economic infrastructure must be key to 
co-operative development planning. This includes industrial parks, inter-modal 
transport corridors and agricultural parks amongst others. Such infrastructure 
investment would enable the municipality to generate more revenue from 
businesses. Infrastructure patterns that are pillared on the economic logic of the 
local space evolve a regional economic network and ultimately a national one 
based on natural economic capabilities of various areas.  
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It is such economic foresight that will enable municipalities to engage with the 
global economy as contributing players rather than beggars for investment. The 
mission of co-operative development planning policy must be to enable 
municipalities to be sound global economic players. Currently South African 
municipalities are presenting themselves as victims of global investors and 
metropolitan municipalities. This approach is a departure from “buffalo hunting” 
or investor chasing as it empowers the municipality to work with its local realities, 
resources and talent to explore markets available for locally produced goods. 
Investors will be secondary part of strategy of global engagement. Broadening 
markets for local business means more revenue and sustainability for local 
business and the municipality. This global engagement is also important for 
understanding global power networks and their agenda in relation to localities. 
Finally, it would also enable municipalities to share in the governance and 
development experiences of other parts of the world. 
 
Amongst key issues South African municipalities need to share globally are 
strategies of engaging the informal sector. The policy mission needs to highlight 
the centrality of this sector, as there are many lessons of dealing with poverty 
and economic challenges found in this sector. The informal sector is the fastest 
growing sector economically and socially. It provides shelter for a significant 
portion of the global population and equally employs large numbers. Ignoring the 
sector is unwise and municipalities do it at their own peril, as evidenced by the 
rest of the African municipalities. Co-operative development planning needs to 
take the informal sector into account in order to be able to do a reasonably 
accurate economic and social analysis. Such analysis will enable the 
municipalities to develop realistic strategies. Equally the informal sector can 
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benefit from transforming the formal sector from a complex restrictive sector to a 
more open and flexible one. These changes will benefit both sectors in the final 
analysis.  
 
Another recommendation is that municipalities must accept that urbanisation is 
here to stay and therefore instead of shying away from urban management 
strategies, they should embrace them. Urban management focus should 
constitute a key element of the co-operative development planning mission. Co-
operative development planning would also ensure that the country has 
diversified urbanism marked by differentiating “micro-perspectives” instead of 
“one-size fits all” solutions to urban challenges. Micro-perspectives will provide 
space for innovation by municipalities in managing urbanisation. In addition, it 
would be unwise for municipalities to ignore rural linkages. The study prefers an 
urban management system that recognises and exploits urban-rural linkages for 
effective development planning. This is important in South Africa because urban 
spaces are encroaching on rural land and this is contentious. 
 
On the basis of this, land management must be another key element of the 
mission of co-operative development planning policy. South Africa, like the rest of 
Africa, has a complex land management system. National government has  
responsibilities regarding state and traditional land. Traditional authorities are 
equally central. Private owners also have a role to play in land management. In 
this context the municipality is the least empowered and yet its constitutional and 
statutory obligations require access to land through a simple and administratively 
efficient mechanism. When an investor is seeking an investment opportunity in a 
municipality that is largely rural, he/she cannot do so without engaging traditional 
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authorities, national and provincial government and, to a limited extent, the 
municipality. Dispersed land management powers and functions are both a 
challenge and opportunity for redefining co-operative development planning. In 
other words, if it can work in land management then the principles can be 
adapted to other areas of development planning.  
 
Finally, the mission of co-operative development planning must be the creation of 
economically active municipalities that can promote strategies such as 
industrialisation. The efforts of all three spheres must be to ensure that 
municipalities are economic players of note. They must identify, pursue and 
create economic opportunities globally. Collaboration must be achieved in 
industrial clustering, promotion of inter-firm linkages, rewarding innovation in 
production and supporting industrial management and organisation. By 
consolidating local business and creating a vibrant, diverse business class, the 
municipality would be able to extend its tentacles of economic power beyond its 
current limits. 
 
Consequently, the central aim of co-operative development planning should be 
the existence of empowered municipalities that steer co-operative development 
planning resulting in economically diverse and active localities, regions and 
country.  
 
Goals of the co-operative development planning policy should include: 
• Robust policy management steered from below 
• Simple and contextual development planning practice 
• Sustainable management of local development  
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5.2.2. Management of co-operative development planning 
The study recommends that the management of co-operative development 
planning must improve information management, programme management, 
financial management, as well as monitoring and evaluation.  
 
5.2.2.1. Information Management 
It was found that the quality of baseline information for planning was not good, 
hence the recommendation of improved information management. Localizing 
Statistics South Africa (SSA) by conducting local statistical fieldwork and thus 
enabling them to support municipalities with baseline data annually could achieve 
this. This is despite the recent weaknesses of data received from SSA regarding 
incorrect economic indicators that was reported widely in the newspapers. This 
study assumes this was due to institutional weaknesses that will be improved 
with time. 
 
Statistical information from SSA could be based at municipal ward level, which is 
the most basic geographic unit found in the Municipal Structures Act (2000). 
Such data will be consolidated at the level of the municipality. Significantly, 
municipalities will rely on accurate data gathering and analysis in areas such as 
local poverty index, skills profiling, economic activities and community needs as 
well as many other categories of development planning data. In turn such data 
will enable contextuality. It can be mapped out like a quilt to reflect a bigger 
picture for co-operative development planning. 
 
It must be the objective of the above process to simplify development-planning 
data. Simplicity of this data will enable all planning networks and stakeholders to 
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integrate efforts into the “development-planning quilt” and thus re-inforce 
municipalities rather than contradict them or compete with them. This 
synchronisation is not a given but is itself a consequence of contextuality as well 
as active lobbying and advocacy. Simplified data will also enable all spheres to 
track their targeting strategies and the effectiveness of their programmes. 
Synchronisation only allows for complementarity through diversified efforts. 
 
The above recommendation also presupposes the ability of a municipality to 
warehouse and circulate this data appropriately. Warehousing requires a well-
developed Municipal Information Management System (MIMS). Warehousing 
also requires a well-oiled infrastructure of accurate data management including 
safe storage. Such management could enable municipal planning and 
management accuracy and pattern analysis. The study doesn’t assume that this 
is an easy objective to achieve as municipalities are plagued by inaccurate 
accounts to users of their services.  
 
Accurate data also requires continuous cleansing and not a once-off effort, as is 
currently the practice at municipalities. Data-warehouse managers have to clean 
the data continuously for it to be relevant. Annual updates should be preceded 
and followed by verification, isolation of corrupt data and clearing the MIMS of 
the latter. This will result in panels of studies about local space and its 
development planning trends. Panelling will result in longitudinal analysis of the 
planning processes, consequences and effects. Once cleaned, the data can be 
used for planning. Clean data allows for accurate benchmarking of development 
planning interventions. The municipality will then be able to extrapolate and 
forecast trends, which will allow them to anticipate changes in the local 
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development context. Equally, the upper sphere could use this data for vertical 
and horizontal aggregation. Vertical aggregation will allow for easier quilted 
planning and trends analysis. Horizontal aggregation will enable cross-sectional 
analysis. All these techniques rely on the data processing and analysis 
capabilities of the municipalities and thus the need for improving information 
management skills and infrastructure.  
 
5.2.2.2. Programme Management 
Programme management can benefit from the above recommendation, but it 
also must be improved for co-operative development planning to work. Firstly, 
consistent with the above, development programmes require all spheres to 
converge with the beneficiary communities or groups in the municipalities. This 
convergence will enhance contextuality. Contextuality in programme design also 
means that these role-players must base their design on specific indicators 
arising from the localised statistical profile.  
 
Secondly, a programme should be designed with a simultaneous assessment of 
the skills required for its implementation. Implementation must be inclusive of 
monitored skills development. This should ensure that the municipality and the 
beneficiary community have skilled human resources. Repeat programmes will 
benefit the municipality from reduced input costs and a local flow of resources 
into the beneficiary community, which otherwise would have been left with only 
external human capital to rely on. 
 
Thirdly, programme design and implementation should lead to increased 
economic value for the municipality. Each programme must increase the asset 
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value of the municipality. Such assets must also ensure that the credit-
worthiness of the municipality is improved. Economic value also relies on the 
articulation of municipal investment with key economic drivers of the local space.  
 
Fourthly, programmes could, where possible, be designed and implemented to 
offset global trade in favour of the municipality. This means programmes must 
ensure that the municipality is able to export its goods and services, whilst 
importing only required goods and services. National indicators such as balance-
of-payments must be localised for municipalities to understand their contribution 
to the national development scenario. Municipalities who are “trade smart” will 
not go “cap-in-hand” to the global trade market but will be actively involved in 
pursuing positive trade indicators. 
 
Fifthly, programme design and implementation should integrate methods utilised 
by the informal sector. These may be affordable and thus lead to improved 
household saving. This is particularly true if the beneficiary community is 
represented by the informal sector. That is not suggesting that programmes not 
targeting the informal sector per se must not take into consideration their 
methods and benefit the informal sector. In many instances this approach will 
enable the municipality, through its development planning programmes, to 
respond to the informal sector’s challenges and solicit their support.  
 
Sixthly, programmes should be designed and implemented to enhance urban 
management systems. They can ensure articulation of sub-systems such as 
transport, workplace, settlement, culture and sanitation to mention but a few. 
Currently, as the study has found there is little regard for urban management 
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systems (UMS) in the municipalities’ survey as well as in the African model of 
LED. At the heart of development planning is the pursuit of efficient UMS, as 
these ensure controlled and directed growth patterns of local industries. 
 
Seventhly, programme design and implementation needs to ensure simplified 
land management. All the above elements of programme design and 
implementation depend on simplified land management. Local social compacts 
on land administration are an important step in allowing the municipality to 
simplify land management. This will secure local and external investors.  
 
Eighthly, programme design and implementation should ensure that there is a 
direct link between programmes and economic production. Direct promotion of 
local productivity bears significant sustainability factors that the municipality 
requires for its own revenue generation and integration of efforts with the private 
sector.  
 
5.2.2.3. Financial Management 
The study recommends a bottom-up financial management model. In this model 
planning must come before budgeting, resulting in financial management 
systems that are based on development planning objectives. Budgeting must, 
like planning, be quilted. Unlike what is currently the case, the municipality must 
do revenue generation independently in the first instance and then inter-
dependently. The model must also entail a programme-based expenditure 
management. This must be directed at the set development planning objectives. 
Financial reporting needs to be programme based, where programmes report on 
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the results that have been met. Overall this model calls for socio-economic 
accounting at all the spheres.  
 
5.2.3. Organisation of co-operative development planning 
 
Programmes organise the various role players into relevant structures and sub-
structures. Municipalities should take the lead in co-operative development 
planning because the quilting technique requires leadership from below. It is 
recommended that the organisation of co-operative development planning should 
improve municipal expertise, stakeholder management, intra- and inter-
governmental relations and international relations. 
 
Contextuality, as noted throughout this treatise, presupposes non-uniform 
treatment of stakeholders and community groups. Contrary to current practice, it 
calls for unique treatment. In addition to this, municipalities must be able to 
resource map stakeholders in order to complement their limited resources. 
Invariably, this approach to stakeholder management will enable municipalities to 
use stakeholders strategically. Consequently, stakeholders will have better 
control and management of development planning. 
 
Vertical Co-operative Governance (VCG) requires, the study recommends, a 
bottom-up approach to development planning structures. The study has 
discussed the quilting technique as a planning method for actualising bottom-up 
planning. This recommendation focuses on the structural organisation of 
development planning. Planning networks must be quilted from the local 
interests, to municipal, regional, provincial and national levels. Aggregated co-
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ordination of effort will lead to consistent planning at the different levels. The first 
planning stage must be at the level of role-players and stakeholders. Secondly, 
municipal wards must aggregate ward interests into a ward plan. Thirdly, ward 
plans must be consolidated into municipal plans. Fourthly, municipal plans must 
be consolidated into district plans. Fifthly, district plans must be consolidated into 
provincial plans. Sixthly, provincial plans must be consolidated into national 
plans. Each step in this sequence will have a multi-stakeholder forum that has to 
ensure consistency and efficiency of plans.  
 
Regarding horizontal co-operative government (HCG), this study recommends 
that the relevant stakeholders with relatively similar resources and capacity plan 
together. It also requires that different sectors identify inter-dependent variables 
collaboratively and ensure consistency in their sectoral plans and resource 
utilisation at the same level. Basic sectors in the South African context would 
include community organisations, NGOs, labour, government, public entities and 
business. The composition and functioning of these HCG structures will be 
determined by specific conditions that prevail in each level. 
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5.2.4. Summary Model 
In summary the recommendations propose the following model: 
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Diag. 5.2. Quilted Co-operative Development Planning Model 
5.2.5. Weaknesses of the study and areas of further research 
Methodologically, the main weakness of the study is its inability to get responses 
from more municipalities as initially envisaged. Equally, getting respondents from 
the national departments could have balanced the study more. Inclusion of the 
new Inter-Governmental Relations legislation could also have enriched the 
findings. Theoretically, the study may be accused of economic reductionism and 
this is despite its selected focus on LED. Institutionally, the study could be seen 
to be atomising development planning institutional mechanisms. All these 
weaknesses, despite being important, do not significantly undermine the findings. 
Instead, they present further possibilities for research. 
 
Further research could be done with more respondents from across the country. 
Also, a study focusing on evaluating co-operative governance in development 
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planning for the social sector could offer interesting comparison with this study. 
Finally, this study sets firm foundations for the development of a theory on the 
quilted planning model and this could be pursued at a higher academic level. 
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Qualitative Questionnaire  
Evaluation of Co-operative Governance in IDP (LED) 
 
A. Situational analyses: 
 
1. What is your understanding of the government collaboration in planning? 
2. In what ways is this being realised in situational analyses for LED? 
3. How are local stakeholders and role-players participating in LED situational 
analysis?  
4. How can this be improved? 
 
B. Vision, objectives and goals 
 
5. In what ways are the vision, objectives and goals aligned to national and 
provincial economic objectives? 
6. How were various economic interests of local stakeholders and role-players 
taken into consideration when drawing the vision, objectives and goals?  
7. How can the alignment of national and provincial economic policies to the LED 
vision, objectives and goals be improved? 
  
C. Strategies 
 
8. In what ways were the LED strategies aligned to provincial and national 
economic strategies? 
9. What mechanisms were utilised in ensuring effective participation by local role-
players and stakeholders in crafting LED strategies? 
10. How can the quality of this participation be improved? 
11. How can consistency and co-ordination of strategies between the various 
spheres of government be improved? 
 
D. Programme and project implementation 
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12. In which ways are the LED programmes and projects linked to provincial and 
national economic programmes and projects? 
13. How can the level of coherence, support and consistency of economic 
programmes and projects between the various spheres be improved? 
14. How were LED programmes linked to those of local role-players and 
stakeholders? 
 
E. Budgeting and expenditure management  
 
15. In what ways have the various spheres of government co-operated in budgeting 
and expenditure management in LED? 
16. In what ways have the local stakeholders and role-players co-operated in LED 
budgeting and expenditure management? 
17. How could co-operation in budgeting and expenditure management be improved 
in LED? 
 
F. Monitoring and evaluation  
 
18. How has inter-governmental collaboration been in LED monitoring and 
evaluation? 
19. How have local role-players and stakeholders contributed to LED monitoring and 
evaluation? 
20. In what ways can inter-governmental co-operation in LED monitoring and 
evaluation be improved? 
21. How can the role of local stakeholders and role-players be improved in LED 
monitoring and evaluation? 
  
 
 
Thank you for your co-operation and support in this study. 
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Quantitative Questionnaire 
Evaluation of Co-operative Governance in IDP (LED) 
 
Municipal Name  : 
Category   : 
LED Budget   : 
Number of LED employees : 
 
A. Situational analyses: 
 
1. Which sphere(s) of government are actively involved in situational analyses for 
LED? Please select from the following: 
 Province 
 National 
 
2. Which tools do the municipality for situational analysis in LED use? Please select 
the right answer(s) 
 Questionnaire 
 Workshops 
 Written Submissions 
 Experts 
 Other, specify 
 
3. Are the tools used in the situational analysis successful in identifying real LED 
needs of the community? 
 Yes 
 No 
  
B. Vision, objectives and goals 
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4. Which policies are best represented by your LED vision, objectives and goals? 
 GEAR 
 PGDP 
 LED White Paper 
 Other 
 
5. How was the alignment of your LED vision, objectives and goals with the national 
and provincial economic policies? 
 Policy workshop 
 Experts 
 Interviews 
 Submissions 
 Other 
 
6. How did local stakeholders and role-players contribute to the development of the 
LED vision, objectives and goals? 
 Policy workshop 
 Experts 
 Interviews 
 Submissions 
 Other 
 
C. Strategies 
 
7. The LED strategies of the municipality were informed by the: 
 Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy 
 Urban Renewal Strategy 
 BEE strategy 
 Public Private Partnership strategy 
 Land Reform strategy 
 Spatial Development Initiatives including IDZs 
 Other 
 None 
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8. Which tools were used for co-ordinating LED strategies between the three 
spheres of government? 
 Policy workshop 
 Experts 
 Interviews 
 Submissions 
 Other 
 
 
9. Were the tools of co-ordination effective? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t Know 
 
10. In your view, how would you rate the level of participation by local role-players 
and stakeholders? 
 0 – 10% 
 10 – 30% 
 30 – 50% 
 50 – 80% 
 80 –100% 
 
D. Programme and project implementation 
 
11. Do all spheres of government collaborate in the implementation of economic 
programmes and projects? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t Know 
 
12. Which of the following resources do the different spheres of government in LED 
implementation share? 
 Finance 
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 Human Resources/ Skills 
 Equipment 
 Other 
 None 
Don’t Know 
 
13. In which aspects has there been co-operation between the municipality and local 
role-players and stakeholders in LED implementation? 
 Financial resources 
 Human Resources 
 Equipment 
 Information 
 Other 
 None 
 Don’t Know 
 
14. Which aspects of co-operation in project implementation require improvement? 
 Management of financial resources 
 Human Resources Management 
 Performance standards 
 Technology application 
 Other 
 None 
 Don’t Know 
 
E. Budgeting and expenditure management  
 
15. LED had better inter-governmental co-operation in the following areas, please 
select: 
 Expenditure planning 
 Revenue mobilisation 
 Cash Flow Management 
 Financial controlling 
 Auditing 
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 Reporting 
 Other 
 None 
 Don’t Know 
 
16. How would you rate the level of inter-governmental financial co-operation in 
LED? 
 Very Low 
 Low 
 Medium 
 High 
 Very High 
 
 
 
17. What percentage of the LED budget was spent in the last financial year? 
 0 – 10% 
 10 – 30% 
 30 – 50% 
 50 – 80% 
 80 –100% 
 
18. In which areas have the local stakeholders and role-players participated in LED 
budgeting and expenditure management? 
 Expenditure planning 
 Revenue mobilisation 
 Cash Flow Management 
 Financial controlling 
 Auditing 
 Reporting 
 Other 
 None 
 Don’t Know 
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F. Monitoring and evaluation  
 
19. Was the LED monitoring and evaluation framework developed through inter-
governmental co-operation? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t Know 
 
20. Did local role-players and stakeholders participate in designing LED monitoring 
and evaluation? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t Know 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Which areas of LED monitoring and evaluation require improvement for effective 
co-operative government? 
 Service Level Agreements 
 Performance Standards 
 Satisfaction surveys 
 Internal and/or External Audits 
 Reporting 
 Other 
 Don’t Know 
 
Thank you for your co-operation and support in this study. 
 
 
Signature:…………………………………………….. 
 
Date:…………………………………………………... 
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